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Restoring Free Exercise Protections by

Limiting Them:

Preventing a Repeat of Smith
JAMES

M. DONOVAN °

INTRODUCTION
A. SMITH:' DESCRIPTION AND EFFECT

By the end of 1989, constitutional analysts felt secure in their
understanding of the Free Exercise Clause. In simplest terms, its evolved
meaning was that religious practices were not to be excessively burdened,
save for a state interest of compelling force. Against this presumed
background a new case was argued, one which seemed at first to be merely
a new but minor elaboration on the well-settled unemployment compensation
cases, which began with Sherbert v. Verner.2
In that case, Adell Sherbert, a Seventh-Day Adventist, refused a new
work schedule which required her to work on Saturday, her Sabbath.
Because no compromise seemed possible, she left her job and applied for
unemployment compensation. These benefits were initially denied to her
"on the ground that the state supplied unemployment benefits for people for
whom work was unavailable, not for people who were unavailable for
work." The Supreme Court overturned this decision, however, reasoning
that to judge whether a state action infringed on the Free Exercise guarantees, the court must ask (a) has religious practice been burdened; (b) did the
* B.A., University of Tennessee at Chattanooga; M.L.I.S., Louisiana State University;
Ph.D., Tulane University; Librarian for Access Services, Tulane University School of Law
(on leave).

This Article is dedicated to the memory of my late partner, Jorge M. Vfisconez. The
more time that goes by, the more I realize what I lost. Many individuals contributed to the
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1. Employment Div., Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S.
972 (1990).
2. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).

3. RONALD B. FLOWERS, THAT GODLESS COURT: SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON
CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS 30 (1994).
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state have a compelling state interest in placing the burden; and (c) did no
4
other means exist to achieve the state's legitimate goal?
When arguments were made for Employment Division, Department of
Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith,' both sides expected the outcome to
be determined by the Sherbert test. Like Sherbert, this case involved the
denial of unemployment benefits, this time to two members of the Native
American Church, Alfred Smith and Galen Black. They had been fired
from their jobs as drug counselors after participating in a religious ritual
which included the ingestion of peyote, a criminally proscribed drug in
Oregon.' Smith and Black were denied unemployment benefits because the
reasons for their discharge were grounded in "work-related misconduct"
which involved the breaking of criminal law.7 It seems worthwhile to keep
in mind that Smith and Black were not asking for their jobs back; that is,
they were not contesting the right of the counseling center to fire them.
Instead, all they desired was that their religious practices not bar them from
receiving governmental aid in the form of unemployment benefits, even if
those practices involved actions which were technically illegal.'
The question was whether the First Amendment protections for
religious exercise extended to exempt these men from criminal laws that
were not specifically directed against the peyote rituals of the Native
American Church, and were otherwise generally applicable. Both parties
had assumed that the compelling interest test was the standard to be met,
and had limited their arguments to the issue of whether Oregon had a
compelling interest in the exception-less enforcement of its drug laws.
The decision handed down in the spring of 1990 shocked, stunned, and
even enraged the nation. First, it denied that the compelling interest test
was applicable in most Free Exercise contexts. Smith thus broke with
procedural precedent by not first soliciting new briefs and arguments after
the Court had determined that it wished "to reconsider important issues not
briefed by the parties."9 The Court "fundamentally changed the law of free
exercise without briefs or arguments, in an abstract case created by the
Court."' 0
Where once states could interfere with religious observances for only
the most pressing reasons, now, according to Smith, states had free reign

4. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403-409 (1963).

5. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Id. at 874.
Id.
Id. at 875.
Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 36.
Id.
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only so long as they did not directly target religions. Religions, however,
were due no special protections or exemptions from otherwise generally
applicable laws.
Everyone seems agreed on what this decision did: now that "federal
courts cannot protect the exercise of religion from formally neutral and

generally applicable laws," the practical outcome has been that "[m]any

judges, bureaucrats, and activists have taken Smith as a signal that the Free

Exercise Clause is largely repealed, and that the needs of religious

minorities are no longer entitled to any consideration."" Even those
concerned to defend Smith's "rejection of constitutionally compelled free
exercise exemptions" wish to do so "without defending Smith itself," which
is "neither persuasive nor well-crafted."' 2
So visceral has been the response, that Congress passed the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA"), 3 which again requires that govern11. Douglas Laycock, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 1993(l) BYU L. REv.
221, 225; See also Thomas C. Berg, What Hath Congress Wrought? An Interpretive Guide
to the ReligiousFreedom RestorationAct, 39(1) VILL. L. REv. 1, 7 (1994): "Strictly applied,
the Smith rule destroys most constitutional protection of religious practice;" and FLOWERS,
supra note 3, at 35. "The effect of Smith was essentially to declare the Free Exercise Clause
null and void." Id.
Although Smith itself speaks of generally applicable criminallaws, "lower federal
courts have applied the decision to free exercise cases involving any across-the-board, neutral
law; they make no distinction between criminal and civil laws." James J. Musial, Free
Exercisein the 90s: In the Wake ofEmployment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith,
4 TEMP. POL. & CIv. RTS. L. REv. 15, 29 (1994)(emphasis added); see also Matthew S.
Steffey, The Establishment Clause and the Lessons of Context, 26 RUTGERS L.J. 775, 787
n.45 (1995).
12. William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U.
CHI. L. REv. 308, 309 (1991). For instance, Michael W. McConnell points out that "[tlhe
primary affirmative precedent marshalled by the Court to support its decision consists entirely
of overruled and minority positions." Michael W. McConnell, FreeExerciseRevisionismand
the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 1109, 1125 (1990).
13. Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993). Although presented as a return to
pre-Smith standards, especially as articulated in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963),
there is some argument about whether such a presentation is historically accurate.
Christopher L. Eisgruber and Lawrence G. Sager, Why the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act is Unconstitutional,69 N.Y.U. L. REv. 437, 447 (1994). Further arguments for RFRA's
unconstitutionality can be found in Smith v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm 'n, 51 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 700, 722 (1996) (Mosk, J., concurring). The Supreme Court has recently agreed to
hear a case involving a church in Boerne, Texas. Boerne, Texas v. Flores, No. 95-2074,
argued Feb. 19, 1997, 65 U.S.L.W. 3627 (Mar 18, 1997). It wants to expand and renovate
its building, but the city objects that that would ruin an historical monument. The case will
determine the constitutionality of RFRA. My guess: RFRA will be judged unconstitutional.
This article proceeds under the assumption that Smith, not RFRA, will be setting, for the long
term, the tone and standard in Free Exercise law.
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mental actions burden religious exercise only if they further a compelling
interest and are the least restrictive means to further those interests.
A reasonable question is how such a decision as Smith came to be
written. To assert that religious exercise has no constitutional guarantees or
protections (excepting the rare instance when religious practices are
specifically targeted) 4 certainly contradicts most Americans' understanding
of the First Amendment. Part of the emotional reaction to Smith seems to
be that it took most constitutional scholars by surprise, even if, in retrospect,
it ought not. We may perhaps more effectively address the issues raised by
Smith if we better understand its intellectual genealogy. So, where did
Smith come from?
I. WHENCE SMITH?
A. JUSTICE SCALIA AND CHRISTIAN PREFERENCE

Unless one is willing to suppose that the justices function with large
measures of sheer caprice, Smith must be the outcome of some logical (in
the structural sense of being internally consistent, not necessarily in the
valuational sense of being reasonable) line of thought. Most critics are
agreed that the stated justifications within the opinion are shallow attempts
to rationalize an outcome rendered necessary by other, unstated motivations.
"When a decision is dubious or demonstrably wrong as a matter of text,5
else."'
precedent, and original intent, it must be based on something
What is Smith's "something else"?
One possibility suggests itself in the identity of Smith's author, Justice
Scalia. Reading Smith, as well as his dissents in Lee v. Weisman' 6 and
Edwards v. Aguillard,"7 one could easily conclude that Scalia is not at all
interested in protecting equally the religious rights of every citizen. 8
14. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217
(1993).
15. Laycock, Remnants, supra note 9, at 3.
16. 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992).
17. 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
18. In trying to make sense of Smith, and by inference of Scalia's understanding of
religious liberty, it does not help that he directly contradicts himself. He writes here that the
Court has "never held that an individual's religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with
an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate." Employment
Div., Dept. of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878-879 (1990). Yet just over a
year earlier he himself summarized the unemployment compensation cases (e.g., Sherbert,
Thomas, and Hobbie) as the Court's holding "that the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment requiredreligious beliefs to be accommodated by granting religion-specific
exemptions from otherwise applicable laws." Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 38
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Instead, he is concerned at all points that majoritarian Christian theism
should be accommodated. 9 By contrast, minority theistic expressions, or
even non-theistic religious outlooks, are to be tolerated, but only so long as
such toleration does not greatly inconvenience the aforementioned majority.20 Thus, Scalia has no problem with psychologically coercing high
school students to acquiesce to prayers at graduation ceremonies. 2' The
Christian majority has been conducting such services for many years, and
somehow a tradition of religious domination eventually becomes a right to
religiously dominate. Scalia joined in Justice Kennedy's opinion that any
"test for implementing the protections of the Establishment Clause [and
presumably also the Free Exercise Clause] that, if applied with consistency,
would invalidate longstanding traditions cannot be a proper reading of the
Clause."22
(1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
If his statement in Texas Monthly is correct, then Smith overrules all of the
unemployment compensation cases. In fact Smith preserves these cases by making ad hoc
distinctions, such as its convenient discovery of the "hybrid" constitutional condition. If he
regards the statement as wrong, and he should refute it lest it mislead others.
In any case, it is Scalia's inconsistencies, and willingness to reinterpret not merely
the Constitution, but also history, which has introduced "a new strain of irrationality in our
Religion Clause jurisprudence." Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. 1, 45.
19. Scalia would seemingly draw support for his preferential treatment of Christianity
from Prof. Jesse H. Choper. Choper believes that psychological ostracism is insufficient to
trigger constitutional notice, and that the state display of dominant religious symbols sends
a message "to religious minorities [that] is in [no] meaningful way as hurtful and offensive
as [a similar display of racial preference] is to racial minorities." JESSIE H. CHOPER,
SECURING RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: PRINCIPLES FOR JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE RELIGION
CLAUSES 101 (1995). Thus, while "favoring the dominant racial group should be (and is)

almost always invalid,... assisting mainstream religious groups need not be forbidden." Id.
at 102. Indeed, the "legislative advantage for mainstream religions should be permitted."
Id. at 103. This casual discarding of the Establishment Clause is only one symptom of
Choper's peculiarly unfortunate reading of the text.
20. Carl Esbeck draws a similar distinction between "right of conscience" and "toleration."
[T]olerance holds that the origin of religious rights is the state's grace. The
right of conscience, in contrast, is an assertion that individuals owe an
allegiance to some higher authority that is prior to the duty of citizens to
obey the state. The right of conscience thereby implies a limited state.

Carl Esbeck, A Restatementof the Supreme Court'sLaw of ReligiousFreedom. Coherence,

Conflict, or Chaos? 70 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 581, 623 (1995). Scalia seemingly holds
mainstream Christians to be entitled to a right of conscience, while all others to tolerance
only.
21. See Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2679 (1992).
22. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573,670 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part). Earlier the same superiority of traditional practice over
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On the other hand, governmental construction of a road through sacred
Indian lands should not be impeded, even though everyone agrees that the
need for such a road is far from compelling, and that such construction will
effectively destroy the religion." These long-standing traditional religious
practices are not to be preserved. When the most pallid and perfunctory of
Christian rituals is inconvenienced, Scalia literally seethes with frothy selfrighteousness which is nowhere displayed when a non-Christian religion is
threatened with extinction.24
Scalia does not intend to foster an actual governmental neutrality
toward religion. Instead, he professes an extremely controversial opinion
that government has an "interest in fostering respect for religion generally."'25 But apparently religions are not entitled to this respect on an equal
basis. His words suggest that he sympathizes with those who lament
Christian theism's fall "from a preferred position within the religion clauses,
[to one where it] has been relegated to the level of all other belief sys-

constitutional principle was used to permit the use of tax funds to provide legislative
chaplains. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983). In a concurring opinion to County of
Allegheny, Justice O'Connor responded to Kennedy's claim with the following:
Historical acceptance of a practice does not in itself validate that practice
under the Establishment Clause if the practice violates the values protected
by that Clause, just as historical acceptance of racial or gender-based
discrimination does not immunize such practices from scrutiny under the
Fourteenth Amendment. As we recognized in Walz v. Tax Comm 'n of New
York City, 397 U.S. 664, 678 (1970): "[N]o one acquires a vested or
protected right in violation of the Constitution by long use, even when that
span of time covers our entire national existence and indeed predates it."
492 U.S. at 630. It is unclear how Marsh could have ended in the result that it did if
O'Connor's view were commonly accepted.
23. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
24. Verna C. Sinchez, Whose God Is It Anyway? The Supreme Court, the Orishas,and
Grandfather Peyote, 28 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 39, 60 (1994):
The assumption that in the United States "there is a single voice making
this affirmation [of being a Christian nation]," permitted the Smith Court
to uphold a law which so directly affected a fundamental belief and practice
of a non-Christian religion, and dismiss it as merely incidental. Justice
Scalia's reasoning in Smith made it clear that he sees no cause for concern
in this matter.
25. Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2682 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Neutrality
would imply that religions are free to thrive or wither without governmental intervention;
"fostering respect," on the other hand, suggests that government has an interest in assuring
the continuity of religion, and that if survival requires governmental intervention, there should
be no hesitation. Scott Idleman shares this yen for a religiously proactive government. Scott
Idleman, The Religious Freedom RestorationAct: Pushing the Limits of LegislativePower,
73 TEX. L. REv. 247, 264 (1994).
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'
tems."26
Smith abandons religious exercise to the vagaries of the political
process; exemptions to generally applicable laws, while no longer enjoying

constitutional imprimatur, may be doled out piecemeal by the legislature.

Yet there seems to be an inherent contradiction in believing both that
legislative bodies cannot be trusted to avoid directly targeting unpopular

26. John W. Whitehead & John Conlan, The Establishmentofthe Religion of Secular
Humanism and its First Amendment Implications, 10 TEx. TECH L. REV. 1, 15 (1978).
Justice Kennedy sarcastically expresses a similar conclusion in County ofAlleghenyv. A CL U,
492 U.S. 573, 677 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("Those religions enjoying the largest
following must be consigned to the status of least favored faiths so as to avoid any possible
risk of offending members of minority religions.") Like Scalia, Whitehead and Conlan
believe that the teaching of evolution has been the undoing of American society. Id.
The belief that Christianity should hold a special place within American political life
is intimately related to the view that American society has a special role to play in
Christianity. This view, often labeled "civil religion" after the writings of sociologist Robert
N. Bellah, THE BROKEN COVENANT: AMERICAN CIVIL RELIGION INTIME OF TRIAL (2d ed.,
1992), consists of a generic Christianity which regards the United States of America as the
new Jerusalem, the biblical "city on the hill" intended to shine as a beacon to all righteous
men. America is the special tool to work the will of God in this world.
So closely are America and God entwined, however, that civil religion easily
transforms into nationalism, which holds the state to be the supreme value, with God
becoming merely an instrument thereof. The Supreme Court has often espoused nationalist
views, as it did in UnitedStatesv. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605 (1931). In that case, a resident
alien was denied naturalization because he refused to swear to take up arms and defend the
United States unless he felt the cause to be moral. The implication of the decision was that
there is no higher authority than the state to which loyalty is owed:
When he speaks of putting his allegiance to the will of God above his
allegiance to the government, it is evident ...that he means to make his
own interpretationof the will of God the decisive test which shall conclude the government and stay its hands. We are a Christian people....
But, also, we are a Nation with a duty to survive; a Nation whose
Constitution contemplates war as well as peace; whose government must go
forward upon the assumption, and safely can proceed upon no other, that
unqualified allegiance to the Nation and submission and obedience to the
laws of the land, as well those made for war as those made for peace, are
not inconsistent with the will of God.
Id. at 625. Although Flowers suggests that Macintosh was "the last time the Court ever
articulated the Christian nation heresy" that the "will of the State is essentially equivalent
with the will of God." FLOWERS, supra note 3, at 55, 56. McConnell, however, intimates
that Smith smacks of this same "heresy." McConnell, supra note 12, at 1152. Nationalism
in this sense - the state as supreme entity - probably motivates recent efforts to
constitutionally forbid desecration of the state's symbolic embodiment, the flag."
Legal scholars often fail to preserve the technical distinction between civil religion
and nationalism, as evidenced by the following claim: "Professing and practicing religion out
of civic convention... can soon drift into the corruption known as civil religion, where
culture and nationalism go hand-in-hand with spirituality." Esbeck, supra note 20, at 627.
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religions, as was done in Florida to Santeria,2 7 and also that these same
bodies can be relied upon to be sensitive to the requirements of minority
religions. On the contrary, the legislative history of RFRA explicitly doubts
2
the reliability of legislative bodies to protect minority religions. "
Even Scalia recognizes that "leaving accommodation to the political
process will place at a relative disadvantage those religious practices that are
not widely engaged in." 29 History has already shown us what treatment
3
disfavored religions, such as Mormonism ° and Jehovah's Witnesses,
can expect from popularly elected legislative bodies. But as this penalty
will not be imposed upon his own mainstream Christian theism, this is a
price Scalia is willing (for others) to pay: such inequalities are a regrettable
but "unavoidable consequence of democratic government."32
If indeed one's goal were to restore mainstream Christianity to a
privileged status, one could do no better than Smith. By arguing for a
standard of strict neutrality, Smith effects a de facto preference for
majoritarian Christianity, which can expect never to be seriously inconvenienced by elected bodies.33 Other religious forms will fail to secure either
27. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc., v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217
(1993).
28. Smith v. Fair Employment and Hous. Comm'n, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d 700, 732 (1996)
(Kennard, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
29. Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,890 (1990).
30. FLOWERS, supra note 3, at 20-21; Keith Jaasma, The Religious Freedom
RestorationAct: Responding to Smith; ReconsideringReynolds, 17 WHITTIER L. REV. 211
(1995).
31. FLOWERS, supra note 3, at 21-27.
32. Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resourcesv. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,890 (1990).
33. Cf Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2677 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring):
By definition, secular rules of general application are drawn from the
nonadherent's vantage and, consequently, fail to take such practices into
account. Yet when enforcement of such rules cuts across religious
sensibilities, as it often does, it puts those affected to the choice of taking
sides between God and government. In such circumstances, accommodating religion reveals nothing beyond a recognition that general rules can
unnecessarily offend the religious conscience when they offend the
conscience of secular society not atall.
The distinction Souter here draws between secular and religious applies equally as well to
that between majority and minority religions. See also Laycock, Remnants, supra note 9, at
15; Michael W. McConnell, Neutralityunderthe Religion Clauses, 81 Nw. U. L. REV. 146,
152-153 (1986).
Some partisans are completely unembarrassed to assert that majority religious
preferences should be imposed upon the minority. For instance, Doug Jones, a Southern
Baptist minister, was angry at Lisa Herdahl because she objected to her children being
subjected to obligatory Christian prayer over the loudspeakers each school day:
Now are we a democracy? Does the majority rule? Or is it because one
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consideration of their needs when laws are crafted, or discretionary
exemptions from generally applicable laws.
At best, this dissection of possible motivations could explain only
Scalia's agenda, leaving us uninformed about how he persuaded the majority
to side with him.
B. THE SMITH MAJORITY AND CIVIL ANARCHY

For the Justices in the majority other than Scalia, the rationale behind
Smith must surely lie elsewhere than in an agenda to privilege mainstream
Christianity over all other religious forms. Moreover, we would expect it
to be urgently persuasive. When surrendering religious practices to the
whimsies of legislatures and inescapably subjugating them to generally
applicable laws, the majority cannot have been ignorant of the fact that
"formally neutral, generally applicable laws - the kind that raise no
constitutional issue after Smith - were central to three of the worst episodes
of religious persecution in our history."34 Surely no minor or pedantic
concern, then, would suffice for the majority to abandon religious protections to an environment which has perpetrated shameful oppressions in the
past, with no assurance that these episodes will not be reenacted in the
future.
The key to the majority's concerns lies perhaps in the following
statement:
If the "compelling interest" test is to be applied at all,
then, it must be applied across the board, to all actions

thought to be religiously commanded .... Any society

adopting such a system would be courting anarchy, but
that danger increases in direct proportion to the society's
diversity of religious beliefs, and its determination to
coerce or suppress none of them. Precisely because "we
are a cosmopolitan nation made up of almost every
conceivable religious preference," and precisely because

person is offended that we're - as the majority, we've got to step aside
and say, 'We're going to let Miss Herdahl have her way and we're going
to let anybody else have their way'? Lesley [Stahl, the news reporter],
that's not fair. That's not American.
60 Minutes: Lisa Herdahl v. Pontotoc County, (CBS television broadcast, August 13, 1995)
(transcript). Most thinkers would argue that the majority riding roughshod over the minority
on religious matters is most emphatically not the American way, and that the function of the
Constitution is to prevent religious leaders such as Jones from using popular sentiment if not
the vote to establish their religion.
34. Laycock, RFRA, supra note 11, at 223.
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we value and protect that religious divergence, we cannot
afford the luxury of deeming presumptively invalid, as
applied to the religious objector, every regulation of
conduct that does not protect an interest of the highest
order.35
In fact, this is a legitimate worry: Scrupulous application of the
Sherbert test does court anarchy.
This danger was not always present. Where once "religion" was
synonymous with "Protestant Christianity," that is no longer the case. The
definitional scope of "religion" is now far broader than was originally the
case. This expanded inclusiveness can result in severe difficulties in
attempting to apply fairly the First Amendment's free exercise protections.
Sherbert preceded the decisions which gave new breadth to the term by
several years. It is conceivable that, had Sherbert brought her case after
1970, by which time "religion" had been broadly construed, the outcome or at least the terms of the "Sherbert test" - might have been different.
Because religion is presumed to constitutionally afford extraordinary
protections, its proper definition and identification is an ongoing conundrum.
The Supreme Court, in early decisions such as Reynolds v. United States36
and Davis v. Beason,3 established an initial requirement that legally
recognized religions contained a necessary element of belief in supernatural
entities. United States v. Ballard" later stipulated that the belief at issue
be a sincere belief as opposed to one lightly professed.
Supernaturalisms were removed as a necessary feature of a sincerely
held religious belief by a series of conscientious objector cases which
culminated in United States v. Seeger39 and Welsh v. United States.40 The
cumulative effect of the Seeger and Welsh decisions was to characterize
religious belief not as having a specific, theistic content, but instead as
fulfilling a unique psychological function for the individual. Often referred
to as being an "ultimate concern" for the person, a religious belief is that for
which the adherent would often prefer martyrdom rather than transgress.
Effective fulfillment of the religious function is thus a process which
can operate on any specific content. Practically anything, in other words,
35. Smith, 494 U.S. at 888 (citations omitted).
36. 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (rejecting the claim that criminal laws against polygamy could
not be constitutionally applied to those whose religion commanded the practice).
37. 133 U.S. 333 (1890) (holding that a man could lose his right to vote for belonging
to an organization which advocates the practice of bigamy).
38. 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
39. 380 U.S. 163 (1965).

40. 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
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can have attached to it religious attitudes by at least some persons. Even
golfing can function religiously in some contexts.4'
If anything can be religious, and if government is constitutionally
forbidden from lightly burdening religion through a "compelling interest"
test, then any governmental action can potentially infringe upon someone's
religious beliefs, and every governmental action certainly does religiously
offend at least a few. 2 Unquestionably, all exemption claims under the
Free Exercise claim could not possibly be granted, leading some to believe
that "if we cannot exempt every minority faith, we should not exempt any;"
"even-handed repression" is to be preferred to "imperfect liberty. 4 3
Even if, in principle, one were willing to sort through all claims to find
those which should be respected, the process itself could so overburden the
system as to cause its collapse. Even assuming compelling state interest
supersedes most such claims, the way is open for every pronouncement to
be challenged in lengthy court actions.44
In the environment confronting the Smith Court, efficient legislative
process - that is, the smooth movement from enactment to implementation
- could easily become stultified by the requirement of an intermediate step
ofjudicial challenge. Unless something changed, Smith's worries about civil
anarchy - first voiced over a century ago in Reynolds v. United States45
41. CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 98 (1973). See also Bette
Evans, Contradictory Demands on the First Amendment Religion Clauses: Having It Both
Ways, 30 J. CHURCH & STATE 463, 469 (1988): ("If religion is defined by the function of
the belief system rather than by its content, then any ultimate system of values should qualify
for First Amendment protection. By this characterization, one whose ultimate set of personal
values is music, football, or the Democratic party might well have a legitimate religious
claim.")
42. The "Government cannot help but offend the 'religious needs and desires' of some
citizens." Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439,469 (Brennan,
J., dissenting) (1988).
43. Laycock, Remnants,supra note 9, at 14 (summarizing the view of Justice Stevens).
44. From this perspective, Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Smith offers cold
comfort. Disagreeing with the reasoning of the majority opinion, if not in its outcome, she
believes that the compelling interest test should be retained. However, "Even if, as an
empirical matter, a government's criminal laws might usually serve a compelling interest in
health, safety, or public order, the First Amendment at least requires a case-by-casedetermination of the question, sensitive to the facts of each particular claim," Employment Div.,
Dept. of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 899 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(emphasis added). She expresses a similar sentiment in Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668,
694 (1984). The burden this standard would place upon an already over-taxed judiciary
would overwhelm the system. Some method must be found to limit the cases which require
such close scrutiny, while preserving the essentials of religious freedoms. The goal of this
essay is to propose such defensible limitations.
45. 98 U.S. 145, 166-67 (1879): "Laws are made for the government of actions, and
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- would not be unwarranted." Clearly an unsavory collision was about
to transpire: It "is unlikely that an extremely broad definition of religion will
generous protection of the claims
be permitted to coexist with an 4extremely
7
definition.
that
within
fall
that
Three solutions would avoid the calamity, but each carries its own
price. First, the definition of religion could be scaled back so that once
again it was limited to simple theisms. This solution would not remove all
problems, but would restrict the class of potential challenges so that the
application of a compelling interest test would not paralyze government.
Yet the present functional standard for identifying religion is not the result
of legal whimsy. Because other disciplines (such as anthropology) operating
independently have converged toward this same understanding,48 the
conclusion is sound and reasonable. Moreover, its withdrawal would
introduce anew the set of problems which necessitated its formulation in the
first place. For instance, under a strict theistic standard, Buddhism is not a
religion, and Disneyland, because of its attention to supernatural entities,
might qualify as a church.4
The class is truly as broad as the functional definition requires. The
problem is therefore not how religion is defined; the present legal definition
is intellectually correct and reasonable. Some other way must be found to
limit the claim for religious exemptions. Unless the Court is prepared to
perpetuate an intellectual fiction,5" the solution to our problem must be
while they cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with practices.
... Can a man excuse his practices to the contrary because of his religious belief? To
permit this would be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law
of the land, and in effect permit every citizen to become a law unto himself."
46. Ellis West notes this problem, and suggests that the question then hinges on
"whether the Court can draw the line in any sort of fair and principled manner." Such
guidelines are presently lacking, but West feels that any judicial attempts to decide "who is
eligible for exemptionswill inevitably [be] arbitrary, unpredictable, and discriminatory." Ellis
West, The CaseAgainst a Right Religion-BasedExemptions, 4 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS
& PUB. POL'Y 591, 604-605 (1990). The objective of this essay is to prove West wrong, i.e.,
that rational limits can be identified.
47. CHOPER, SECURING RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note 19, at 63.
48. James M. Donovan, God Is as God Does: Law, Anthropology, and the Definition
of Religion, 6 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 23 (1995). An exhaustive scrutiny of the problem
of anthropological definition of religion is available at James M. Donovan, Defining Religion:
Death and Anxiety in an Afro-Brazilian Cult (1994) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertion, Tulane
University) (on file with author).
49. Donovan, supra note 48, at 84.
50. Governmental entities have, of course, never been shy about perpetrating
intellectual fictions. For instance, the Indiana General Assembly "came close to enacting a
bill that mandated the value of 71(pi) to be 4." Constance Matts, A Baker's Half Dozen
Piecesof IndianapolisTrivia,AMERICAN ASSOC. L. LIBR. NEWSL., June 1996, at 385. But
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sought elsewhere other than in re-instituting what is now recognized to be
an indefensible theistic definition.
A second possible escape is the one selected by Smith. If the
legitimately defined scope of religion cannot be brought into contact with
a legitimate compelling governmental interest test without risking anarchy,
and if both are to be individually preserved within their proper contexts,
then the solution is to not bring them into contact. Thus, Smith ruled that
religious exercise claims (against generally applicable laws) are not subject
to the compelling interest test.
Frankly, this is the lazy strategy. It does admittedly solve that
particular problem, but at enormous cost, in this case the withdrawal of
constitutional Free Exercise rights from minority religious practitioners.
Any subsequent work after Smith the Court intended to be done by the
legislatures, decreeing on a case-by-case basis who would or would not be
exempt from generally applicable laws.
The third and final resolution is one which the courts may be forced to
employ in any event, now that RFRA has tossed this hot potato back into
their hands. It seeks to find preexisting grounds for limiting the scope of
Free Exercise challenges. This would allow such challenges to continue to
succeed where our social tradition believes that they should,5 but does not
invite such numbers of challenges as to undermine the entire system.
C. OUTLINE OF PRINCIPLES TO LIMIT FREE EXERCISE CHALLENGES

Five such criteria for limiting Free Exercise challenges will be offered.
All will be examined in detail below; for presentation's sake, however, they
are briefly introduced here.
The legal definition of religion, reviewed above, received valuable
corroboration from the social sciences. Their discussions on religion do not
end there, and the first two limiting principles have their roots in anthropological and sociological conclusions about the nature and structure of
religion. First, organizations and groups have a weaker claim to Free
Exercise protections than do individuals. Second, these protections extend
necessarily only to central religious beliefs, and exclude peripheral or
ancillary beliefs.

these efforts come at great cost of institutional prestige, if nothing else.
51. For instance, Catholics should have a clear and unambiguous right to celebrate the
Mass. Should prohibition again become the law, under Smith they would have to earn a
legislative dispensation to use wine for the Eucharist. On the contrary, even without such
dispensation, almost everyone would agree that Catholics have a constitutional right to their
Mass, whateverthe winds of popular law-making.
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The remaining three principles are almost certainly less controversial,
and can be seen as arising from the internal axioms of law. Thus, Free
Exercise protections do not extend to actions imposed on unwilling others,
but are instead limited only to personal actions. The fourth principle is that
Free Exercise challenges should fail where exemptions would raise
Establishment concerns. And finally, the fifth and last limiting principle is
that Free Exercise protections shield more strongly those who have new
demands imposed upon them than those who willingly and knowingly move
into situations which create the conflict.52
52. This list of five is not intended to be exhaustive. We could easily include the
feasible argument made by Michael McConnell that a Free Exercise accommodation would
be:
suspect if it requires officials who otherwise would exercise little discretion
to make ad hoc judgments.... If, however, procedures already exist for
case-by-case determinations of a subjective nature by responsible officials,
or if the religious accommodation can be reduced to a simple objective rule
that can be administered at the operational level, the dangers of arbitrariness
are somewhat diminished.
Under this new approach, the government's secular, programmatic interest
in enforcing neutral standards without religious exceptions should be
viewed in a new light. The court should consider not just the substantive
impact of the accommodation, but also its procedural impact. When
decisions must be made quickly, authoritatively, and evenhandedly by
operational personnel [as in deciding to allow deviations from military
uniform regulations], the government may be entitled to resist interposing
requirements of religious accommodation. But when decisions already
involve case-by-case, subjective considerations [as in unemployment benefit
cases], there should be little procedural objection requiring the government
to take religion into account as well.
McConnell, Weutrality, supra note 33, at 156. Interestingly, where McConnell sees the
individualized review process as permitting a more generous environment for Free Exercise
exemptions, Prof. Laycock's reading of Smith implies that this environment is one of the few
remaining contexts in which strict scrutiny is still required:
The Court does not explain why individualized assessment cases are to be
treated differently, but the reason must be that individualized decisionmaking provides ample opportunity for discrimination against religion in
general or unpopular faiths in particular. Courts cannot assume that an
individualized decisionmaking process was religion-blind just because the
underlying statute or legal principle is religion-blind.
Laycock, Remnants, supra note 9, at 48.

In a different work, McConnell proposes three additional limiting principles. They are:
1. "[G]ovemmental interests do not extend to protecting the members of
the religious community from the consequences of their religious choices;"
2. The "government is not required to create exemptions that would make
religious believers better off relative to others than they would be in the
absence of the government program to which they object;" and
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The cumulative result, then, is that the Free Exercise Clause offers its
strongest protections to personal, central beliefs and actions about personal
conduct whose accommodation does not raise Establishment issues, and
which are threatened by new governmental dictates. Least protected would
be group peripheral beliefs and actions which impose demands upon
unwilling others, whose accommodation raises Establishment issues, where
the conflict arises from knowing movement from a context which did not
present this tension into one that did.
II. FIvE LIMITING PRINCIPLES
A. PERSONS ARE BETTER PROTECTED THAN ORGANIZATIONS

1. Rationale
The first two limiting principles take advantage of the latest conclusions
on religion by the relevant social sciences. In both cases, they go against
general trends within the judicial sciences. But as those trends have ended
in the cul ,de-sac that is Smith, the present moment may be opportune to
reevaluate these predispositions lest, as some fear, the entire process repeat
itself.53
Specifically, legal interpretation should consider anew whether
institutions have the same claim to Free Exercise exemptions as do
individuals. Not that institutions should have no such claims, but rather the
graded question of whether they should have identical, or even superior
protections. If they do not, then here would be one major and defensible

3. The "claims of minority religious should receive the same consideration
under the Free Exercise Clause that the claims of mainstream religions
receive in the political process .... To achieve equal rights of conscience,
the courts should frame the free exercise inquiry as follows: Is the
governmental interest so important that the government would impose a
burden of this magnitude on the majority in order to achieve it?"
McConnell, Free ExerciseRevisionism, supra note 12, at 1145-47. Only the second bears
some relation to one of the five herein proposed.
53. Jaasma, supra note 30, at 226. In fact, this may be the second time through this
cycle. Over a century ago, Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878), held that while
there was complete freedom of religious thought, there was no constitutionally required
protection for religious action. That decision's "overly restrictive view of the free exercise
clause virtually read it out of the Constitution for over sixty years." Edwin B. Firmage,
Religion & the Law: The Mormon Experience in the Nineteenth Century, 12 CARDOZO L.
REv. 765, 780 (1991). Later jurisprudence later restored substantive meaning to the clause,
which Smith has now again removed. Having happened twice again, apprehensions that it
might happen a third time are not unfounded.

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 17

limitation to Free Exercise challenges which would avert the civil anarchy
feared by the Smith majority.
The priority of personal religious liberty over corporate religious liberty
has roots in both historical and current legal thought. For instance, Justice
Brennan has claimed that "the values of the First Amendment . ..look
primarily towards the preservation of personal liberty, rather than towards
the fulfillment of collective goals."54 James Madison, in his Memorial and
RemonstranceAgainst Religious Assessments, opined that it "is the duty of
every man to render to the Creator such homage, and such only, as he
believes to be acceptable to him."55 Madison's suggestive use of the
singular is echoed by the language of RFRA: "Government shall not
substantially burden a person's exercise of religion."56 Despite an established practice to read "person" to include corporate groups,57 there is good
ground to reject that reading in this case. The drafters of RFRA originally
defined "person" to include corporate groups, but deleted this provision in
subsequent versions. 8
Indeed, some assert the proposed limit as an established principle of
constitutional law. "In a body of commentary noted for persistent and manysided discord, one conclusion is so widely shared that it can be called
common ground: the Free Exercise Clause is a guarantee of individual
religious liberty."59 Others, however, are just as confident when they
expand this claim, asserting that there "is near universal agreement on the
starting point: the overarching purpose of the First Amendment is to secure
religious freedom, for persons of faith or none, andfor religious organiza-

54. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 610 (1961) (Brennan, J., concurring and
dissenting).

55. FLOWERS, supra note 3, at 147. According to Ira C. Lupu, Free Exercise
Exemption and ReligiousInstitutions: The Case of Employment Discrimination,67 B.U. L.

REV. 391 (1987), "nothing in the debates or early drafts of the religion clauses gives the
slightest support to the concept of corporate free exercise exemptions. The exemption
concern, to the extent it survived, was focused entirely on the possibility of conflict between
secular obligation and individual religious conscience." Id. at 419.
56. Pub. L. No. 103-141, §3(a), 107 Stat. 1488 (1993) (emphasis added).
57. EEOC v. Townley Eng'g & Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 610, 623 (1988) (Noonan, J.,
dissenting) ("Under our Constitution all corporations are persons").

58. Smith v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d 700, 754 (1996)
(Baxter, J., concurring and dissenting).

59. Kenneth L. Karst, Religious Freedom and Equal Citizenship: Reflections on
Lukumi, 6 TUL. L. REV. 335, 350 (1994).
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tions."6 And finally, there are those who are willing to subordinate Free
Exercise protections for individuals to those for groups. 6
The assertion that individual religious liberty is more precious than
institutional religious liberty derives from the unique nature of religion itself
as compared to other cultural "institutions." For example, the economic
system of a society is free-standing. Individual citizens may decide for
themselves whether to participate, and to what extent. But the system is
inherently economical, and all participatory acts within the system are also
unavoidably of economic significance. Because the economic system has
a legitimate "life" apart from the individual, it can be usefully reified and
ascribed innate qualities and even rights which do not devolve from those

of the individual. In other words, the economic system may in and of itself

merit nurturance and protection beyond whatever nurturance and protection
would be due to all of the individual participants within that system.

The religious "institution" is not of this nature at all. If it can be

usefully said that societies have economic systems, it cannot be similarly
said that they have religious systems. Religion is defined by a belief's
placement within the individual'spsychological structure; it is the statement
of his or her "ultimate concern," and is at the pinnacle of the propositional
hierarchy for that person.6 2 This was the conclusion of the Seeger and

35.

60. Esbeck, supra note 20, at 592 (emphasis added). See FLOWERS, supra note 3, at

61. E.g., Esbeck, supra note 20, at 642:
Structural pluralists argue vigorously for the legal rights of all groups, not
just churches, even when that means lessening some individual rights so as
to protect the autonomy of these mediating structures. This expansive view
of associational rights, they argue, ultimately enhances individual freedom
by challenging liberal political theory which postulates that all rights are
held by the individual. Radical individualism leaves the citizenry defenseless in the face of the all too powerful state. If one is genuinely concerned
about preserving human rights, there is more to fear from a state whose
power is checked only by claims of personal autonomy than there is to fear
from granting associations certain rights.
See Frederick Mark Gedicks, Toward a ConstitutionalJurisprudenceof Religious Group
Rights, 1989 WiS. L. REv. 99.
The Court errs, from the present perspective, by subordinating individual faith to
institutional doctrine: "[I]t is the essence of religious faith that ecclesiastical decisions are
reached and to be accepted as matters of faith." Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v.
Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 714 (1976). But this standard is not the "essence of religious
faith," but rather the fundamental requirement for the stability and authority of any
institution, whether governmental or religious.
62. If psychological structure is the defining feature of "religion," then it necessarily
follows that only individuals and not groups can have "religion" (and thereby religious
rights). Groups lack a mind and thus have no psychology of any kind, although being in
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Welsh decisions by the Supreme Court. To transgress a religious belief is
a unique individual harm which has no corporate parallel.6 3
Having gone that far, entailments necessarily follow. Groups and
group activities are "religious" only to the extent that each individual
recognizes them as such for him- or herself. No social group or group
activity is inherently religious. At best, the form we would casually point
to and identify as a culture's "religion" is only the modal religious form for
persons within that culture.64 Different settings will offer different
concordance rates between available religious forms and actual individual
religiosity, meaning that while sometimes knowledge of the modal religious

groups can have particular effects upon the psychology of individuals. Only persons have
a mind, despite frequent attempts to characterize society as a superorganic entity.
Similarly, Ira C. Lupu points out that the sincerity standard for religious belief also
precludes organizations because "organizations cannot hold convictions or make spiritual
commitments, and they cannot demonstrate the sincerity with which organizational positions
are held. Recognizing organizational claims to free exercise exemptions from secular law
thus tends to undermine the entire structure and legitimacy of free exercise law." Lupu,
Free Exercise Exemption, supra note 55, at 423.
The proper locus of religion is thus the individual, and not society, although society
plays an important role in buttressing the religious beliefs for the individual. Scalia ironically
suggests that if religion were correctly understood,judicial interpretation would not be nearly
so difficult, although the correct interpretation would not effect the result he desires.
Church and state would not be such a difficult subject if religion were, as
the Court apparently thinks it to be, some purely personal avocation that
can be indulged entirely in secret, like pornography, in the privacy of one's
room. For most believers it is not that, and has never been.
Lee v. Weisman. 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2685-2686 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting). He is wrong;
religion is only that.
63. That is, it is possible to harm the individual without hurting the group, but there
are no "group injuries" which are not reducibie to injuries to the constituent individuals.
Ironically, West clearly identifies this nonreciprocality, but claims that it argues against
religion-based exemptions:
[It] has been argued that religious persons experience a special kind of
emotional harm or suffering when they obey laws that their religion
commands them not to obey. This argument, however, cuts too narrowly
because there are many truly religious activities whose abandonment,
though seen as undesirable, would not cause "pangs of conscience." [This
objection is addressed in the second proposed limiting principle of this
essay.] Also, it would protect only individuals and not churches, because
churches (institutions) do not have emotions, and their members do not
share the same beliefs or emotions.
West, supra note 46, at 614-15.
64. The nature of religion, and its place within individual psychology and social
structure, are reviewed and developed extensively in Donovan, DefiningReligion,supra note
48.
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form provides legitimate insight into a specific individual's religiosity, at
other times the two bear no relationship to one another. Some traditional,
nontechnological cultures probably have a very high overlap between the
two; our own culture has a very low coincidence between public religious
form and actual religiosity. Indeed, the Supreme Court depended on this
very divergence when it classified some obvious transgressions against the
Establishment Clause as being mere "ceremonial deism" and thus subject to
the de minimis principle.6 5
Social forms are those which have been elaborated and provided for
ready and easy use by the religious consumer, but which do not actually
become "religious" until the forms are installed in the appropriate place
within the individual's belief structure. Without such installation, even full
and overt participation within the system will not necessarily mean that that
system is an expression of that person's religion. External compliance does
not signify internal commitment, and only the latter is relevant for
identifying "religion." This fact required the development of Allport's
distinction between "intrinsic" and "extrinsic" religiosities.66

65. Lex non curat de minimis: The law does not bother with trifles. "The de minimis
principle has some value, as Madison understood and as the Supreme Court occasionally has
understood too; it has referred to 'ceremonial deism' as a way of sweeping under the rug
theistic practices like the invocation 'God save this honorable Court' or 'In God We Trust."'
LEONARD W. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT

176-77 (2nd ed., 1994). These religious references are deemed so meaningless that their
acceptance cannot, to any reasonable man, signify any kind of genuinely religious attitude.
They "have lost through rote repetition any significant religious content." Lynch v. Donnelly,
465 U.S. 668, 716 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Some would argue that this final insignificance is the inevitable result of
government's touch on religion, and should serve as warning to all those who would breach
the wall between church and state.
Ask the Supreme Court to endorse your Christian faith, and they will
relegate the virgin-born Jesus, the only begotten of the Father, the King of
Kings and Lord of Lords, to the company of Santa Claus, Frosty the
Snowman and Alvin the Caroling Chipmunk.
FLOWERS, supra note 3, at 140 (quoting Russell H. Dilday, Jr., then president of Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary, in a speech to the 1984 Southern Baptist Convention).
Milner S. Ball passes on the suggestion that the inability to view some demonstrations and symbols as retaining any genuine religious significance may have been behind
Justice O'Connor's opinion in Lynch, a case which upheld the constitutionality of a citysupported creche. Milner S. Ball, Normal Religion in America, 4 NOTRE DAME J. L. & PUB.
POL'Y 397, 411 (1990)
66. Gordon W. Allport & J. Michael Ross, Personal Religious Orientation and
Prejudice,5 J. OF PERSONAL. & SOC. PSYCHOL. 432 (1966).
A person is said to have an extrinsic orientation when he or she participates in
socially religious activities, but does so primarily for nonreligious benefits.

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 17

If this deconstruction of religion is valid, "religion" is formally
restricted to individual belief and practices.6 7 Free Exercise protections
would most immediately extend to these individual claims. Aggregate or
group practices would be protected only to the extent that they are direct
expressions of individual religious belief. For instance, if the personal belief
is that certain observances must be made in groups (as perhaps with the
Catholic Mass), then these group activities would be protected coextensively

with individual claims.

But many claims involve issues which accrue not from the religious
beliefs of individuals, but rather from the qualitatively different nature of a
corporate group. Relevant here would be tax-exemption issues, or exclusion
from general employment regulations. Because these issues arise only at the
group level, they are at least one step removed from that of the individual,
where "religion" strictly applies with the full force of all that being
"religious" implies. As such, some group claims do not qualify as being
technically "religious," and these should enjoy a lesser share of Free
Exercise protections.68
Extrinsic values are always instrumental and utilitarian. Persons with this
orientation may find religion useful in a variety of ways - to provide
security and solace, sociability and distraction, status and self-justification.
The embraced creed is lightly held or else selectively shaped to fit more
primary needs.
Id. at 434. By contrast, intrinsic orientation connotes what most of us mean when we speak
of a person as being "religious."
Persons with [an intrinsic] orientation find their master motive in religion.
Other needs, strong as they may be, are regarded as of less ultimate
significance, and they are, so far as possible, brought into harmony with the
religious beliefs and prescriptions. Having embraced a creed the individual
endeavors to internalize it and follow it fully.
Id. The Supreme Court edged closer to this distinction when it required that beliefs seeking
First Amendment protections should be "sincerely held." UnitedStates v. Ballard,322 U.S.
78 (1944).
It would do no violence to the founders' intent, I conclude, to suggest that while
intrinsically held religious beliefs merit the fullest accommodation by governmental bodies,
extrinsically held beliefs deserve almost none. The only issue should be how to distinguish
between the two, and not whether the distinction should be made. While this issue is related
to the second limiting principle discussed herein, religious orientation has not been included
here as a separate limiting principle, although fuller development of the theory may make
such inclusion desirable.
67. McConnell, Neutrality,supra note 33, at 159, is thus incorrect when the author
claims that "Religious experience typically is communal and institutional, not individualistic."
The appropriation of religious symbols, rituals, and machinery to achieve "communal and
institutional" ends should not obscure the fact that such symbols, rituals, and machinery
evolved to serve religious ends primarily, and all other goals only secondarily.
68. Under the topic of "current events," we can consider possible ramifications of this
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2. Example: Amos
This limiting principle would alter at least one outcome of recent
jurisprudence. In Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 69 Arthur Mayson had been
employed by the Deseret Gymnasium, a nonprofit facility run by the
Mormon Church. After sixteen years as building engineer, he was fired
because "he failed to qualify for a temple recommend, that is, a certificate
that he is a member of the Church and eligible to attend its temples."70
Mayson contended that his discharge instanced a case of religious discrimination in violation of section 703 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; the
defendant Church, however, argued that section 702 exempted them from
this prohibition. The argument thus became whether extending section 702
"to allow religious employers to discriminate on religious grounds in hiring
for nonreligious jobs ... violates the Establishment Clause."'"
principle. The Orthodox Jews were distressed by proposed USDA regulations to make meat
and poultry safer. Certain of the criteria conflict with their practice of certifying kosher
meats. They ask for a religious exemption. Michael Grunwald, New USDA Regulations
Threaten Kosher Tradition, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), August 3, 1995, at G16.
Should they be given one?
Yes, but not necessarily on the basis of being a religious organization. Any
processor should be allowed to deviate from the guidelines so long as their product is clearly
labeled as not being in compliance with federal inspection standards. Obviously, any
foodstuffs which are not served in their original packaging should be required to meet the
guidelines. Otherwise, the consumer should have the choice and, if so wishing, take the risk.
This solution assumes,perhaps unrealistically, that citizens are willing to assume responsibility for their own lives and choices.
69. 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
70. Id. at 330.
71. Id. at 331. Far less controversial is the exemption of religious bodies from
prohibitions on religious discrimination in occupations which are clearly related to the
practice and dissemination of doctrine. Tius, while the facts of Ohio Civil Rights
Commission v. Dayton ChristianSchools, Inc., 477 U.S. 619 (1986), initially seem to parallel
those of Amos, critical differences appear.
A teacher at a private, religiously operated elementary school, after becoming
pregnant, failed to have her contract renewed because the sect had a belief that "mothers
should stay home with their preschool age children." Id. at 623. She ultimately charged that
she was a victim of sex discrimination; Dayton replied that the First Amendment shielded the
school from such actions because the termination was the result of sincerely held religious
beliefs.
Frederick Mark Gedicks mistakenly characterizes both these cases as involving "a
religious group membership decision." Gedicks, supra note 61, at 105. Neither plaintiff is
petitioning for admission into church membership; both are concerned only to keep their
means of support. While the two are related, they are not identical, since "it does not
necessarily follow from norms of associational freedom that organizations with autonomy
over membership choices should have comparable autonomy over employment choices."
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Justice Brennan clearly stated that Amos instanced "a confrontation
between the rights of religious organization and those of individuals. Any
exemption from Title VII's proscription on religious discrimination
necessarily has the effect of burdening the religious liberty of prospective
and current employees."7 2 The limiting principle proposed here suggests
that the conflict should be weighted in favor of Mayson. The Supreme
Court saw it otherwise, and presumed that maximal flexibility should be
granted the church and not the individual.7 3
Lupu, supra note 55, at 435-436. A case which genuinely touches on issues of religious
group membership is Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696
(1976).
What distinguishes Dayton from Amos is the institutional role of the terminated
person. In Dayton, the woman was employed as a teacher, and could therefore be reasonably
expected to both disseminate and embody church doctrines to students. Earlier the Supreme
Court summarized its conclusion that the "role of the teacher in fulfilling the mission of a
church-operated school".. . [is]... is "critical and unique." NLRB v. CatholicBishop, 440
U.S. 490, 501 (1979). The failure of the teacher in Dayton to conform to church doctrines
would conceivably undermine their importance in the eyes of the children. In Amos,
however, the man had no such role which entailed modeling behavior for emulation by the
students, as he was employed principally for building maintenance. Since his duties did not
extend to the indoctrination of religious doctrine, his failure to receive religious credentials
reasonably undermined no one's perceptions of the credibility of those doctrines. Laycock's
long list of (in his opinion) horrible impositions upon church autonomy fails to consider this
distinction between personnel involved in roles to disseminate religious doctrine (priests,
teachers, bishops, etc.) and those whose roles are wholly mundane, like janitors, cooks, or
bus drivers. Laycock, Remnants, supra note 9, at 43. Necessary autonomy to discriminate
for the one should not be extended to the other.
The parallel issue for tax-exemption cases is that of subsidiarity. If churches proper
are exempted, how far from this core religious institution can the organization stray before
it crosses over into clearly taxable endeavors? See Esbeck, supra note 20, at 640-41.
Benefits granted to a church seminary need not necessarilybe extended to cover, for example,
a clothing store or travel agency operated by the same church. While these latter enterprises
are of undeniable utility to the church, their regulation does not involve the government in
entanglement with questions of religious doctrine. The lower court for Amos devoted
admirable thought and energy to this question. Amos v. The Corporationof the Presiding
Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 618 F. Supp. 1013 (D.C. Utah
1985).
Finally, the fact that Amos is technically an Establishment Clause case and not one
of Free Exercise does not impact the particular arguments being made here. However, the
Mormon Church did contend that the § 702 exemption was required by the Free Exercise
Clause. The Court deigned not to take up this issue. The later Smith, of course, taught us
that the Clause requires no exemptions.
72. Amos, 483 U.S. at 340 (Brennan, J., concurring).
73. This discounting of individual religious rights in favor of group rights is at odds
with other Supreme Court statements. For instance, in Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 50
(1985), the Court had "identified the individual'sfreedom of conscience as the central liberty
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The Court, repeating the need for institutional autonomy, found no
problem with the exemption.7 4 However, the analysis offered above

identifies the fatal flaw with the exemption in this case. The Court reached

its result by applying the much-beleaguered Lemon test instead of that of
strict scrutiny. Yet as Amos itself reiterates, "laws discriminating among
religions are subject to strict scrutiny . . . and laws 'affording a uniform
benefit to all religions' should be analyzed under Lemon."7 But the Court
has mistakenly characterized this exemption as not distinguishing among
religions.
Legal scholarship has yet to fully come to terms with the functional
definition of religion. Even when intellectually acknowledging that religions
need not be theistic, authors still lapse into that assumption. For example,
Idleman wonders that "it would be interesting to know on what secularbasis
Congress decided to protect religious practices but not analogous nonreligious practices."76 But from a functional perspective, there are no
"analogous" nonreligious practices, since if they are truly analogous,
they
are necessarily also religious.7 7
Amos reveals a similar lack of appreciation of what a functional
definition requires. The issue is the scope of the exemption. As stated, the
that unifies the various Clauses in the First Amendment." Id. (emphasis added). And at least
one right - a Free Exercise claim to abortion - is unique to individuals and cannot be
claimed by an organization. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 320-321 (1980). Given this
conflict, we are not surprised to read Idleman's conclusion that Amos is a "relatively
unreliable case." Idleman, supra note 25, at 291.
74. Esbeck, supra note 20, at 636-637. Autonomy issues are argued, for instance, in
SerbianEastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich,426 U.S. 696 (1976). Esbeck reads the
deference extended by Amos to have been compromised by Jimmy Swaggert Ministriesv.
Board of Equalization,493, U.S. 378 (1989), because it "subject[s] religious organizations
to the same regulation and taxation as any business."Id at 638. According to Laycock, this
step away from complete autonomy of religious organizations portends horrible consequences.
Laycock, Remnants, supra note 9, at 56. While Berg believes that employment exemptions
should be given to religious organizations unless good reason can be found for their denial,
the present argument here is that, for non-religious roles, the burden is on the organization
to demonstrate its need for the exemption. Berg, supra note 1 i, at 39-40.
75. Amos, 483 U.S. at 339.
76. Idleman, supra note 25, at 286.
77. This is why the nonpreferentialist interpretation of the Religion Clauses is
irrational. Its advocates, such as Scalia and Rehnquist, agree that the state cannot aid one
religion over another, but argue that nothing prevents the state from aiding all religions
equally. Levy articulates many of the weaknesses of this approach. One which he misses
relates to the definitional scope of religion. LEVY, supra note 65.
If anything can be "religion," and if everything probably is religion to somebody,
then even if the Constitution permitted nonpreferential treatment of religion in theory, it
would be impossible in practice to be so evenhanded.
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§ 702 exemption extends only to "a religious corporation, association,
educational institution, or society with respect to the employment of
individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected with the
carrying on by such corporation, association, educational institution, or
society of its activities. 78 This specification is too narrow on two counts.
First, Justice Brennan suggests that the exemption should apply across the
board to all nonprofit organizations, not just to religions.79
More relevantly to our discussion, however, is whether its practical
application equates "religion" with "church" or some clearly affiliated arm
of a denominational body. Most obviously, religions without churches are
excluded from this exemption from general laws against discrimination. The
guarantees of personal religions - those with a congregation of one established by Frazee v. Illinois Department of Employment Security" are
effectively overridden.
Even if all churches are religious in the sense of the functional
definition (which they are not, and thus the exemption is overinclusive from
this perspective), institutions which serve religious functions for other
citizens, but which are nontheistic and thus do not "look like" the typical
church devoted to postulated supernatural entities, would be excluded. For
example, within the religion of nationalism,8' the political parties function
analogously to theistic churches. Any exemption granted to a generic
"religion" must extend to the Democratic and Republican National
Committees, as well. Certainly the political parties are not serving religious
functions for all of its members, but then neither are theistic churches, and
on this dimension the two can be distingvished only in degree, and not by
kind.
The exemption, however, certainly was not intended to extend as far
as this. This means, however, that the "law discriminat[es] among
religions," rather than "affording a uniform benefit to all religions," and thus
the standard of strict scrutiny should apply rather than the more lenient

78. Amos, 483 U.S. at 329 n.I.
79. Amos, 483 U.S. at 345 (Brennan, J., concurring). His reasoning is as follows: He
agrees with the present essay that "ideally, religious organizations should be able to
discriminate on the basis of religion only with respect to religious activities." Id. at 343.
Unfortunately, this would require judicial determination of religious versus secular activities,
which would create "excessive entanglement" and "create the danger of chilling religious
activity." Id. at 344. This risk is particularly grave with respect to nonprofit activities. He
would thus extend the exemption to all nonprofit activities, ostensibly religious and not, and
then preclude a case-by-case evaluation of the "religiousness" of any.
80. 489 U.S. 829 (1989).
81. See supra note 25 (brief description of the religion nationalism).
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Lemon test. If the Mormon church succeeds under the latter, it may not do
so under the former.
This result, however, would render section 702 unconstitutional in its
entirety, and not simply as applied to personnel engaged in nonreligious
activities. The present discussion would have no objection to a limited
exemption pertaining to personnel functioning in recognized religious
capacities. However, it remains to be seen whether it can be written so as
to truly apply to all religions, and not just theistic religions with organized
churches.
The first limiting principle, then, is an entailment of the very meaning
of "religion." If "religion" derives its unique and identifying features from
the individual, any attempt to preserve "religion" must likewise focus its
attention on the individual. Organizations and groups may enjoy some
reflected or derivative rights, but only because they partially dwell in the
protective penumbra surrounding persons. Group religious rights are thus
always subordinate to individual religious rights where the two conflict, and
only individual religious rights are entitled to the full and unmitigated
protections of the Free Exercise Clause.
B. CENTRAL BELIEFS ARE BETTER PROTECTED THAN PERIPHERAL BELIEFS

1. Rationale
Not all beliefs seeking shelter under the First Amendment are equal.
First, the candidate belief must be "religious." The tone of Smith makes it
clear that the high court is loathe to venture into the terrain of discriminating within and among religions. Still, its constitutional obligations require
first that it distinguish religious beliefs from nonreligious beliefs.
Some argue that the cumulative effect of several Supreme Court rulings
renders challenge to a claim of religiosity impermissible. s2 But frequently
the lower courts agree it should be left to the judiciary to independently
82. Anita Bowser, Delimiting Religion in the Constitution: A Classification Problem,

I I VAL. U. L. REv. 163, 191 (1977):
If religion under law, according to the Welsh decision, involves nothing
more than a "deeply and sincerely" held belief which may be "purely
ethical or moral in source and content," and if under Seeger the inquiry
must be limited to "whether the beliefs professed by a registrant are
sincerely held and whether they are in his own scheme of things religious,"
and if Ballardmandates that "no inquiry can be made into the verity of
beliefs," then under the combined holdings, presumably, the mere assertion
by an individual that his beliefs are religious is the only prima facie
evidence needed to substantiate the validity of the professed beliefs. What
is held out to be a religious claim, therefore, cannot be challenged.
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certify what is or is not religious. In Malnak v. Yogi, 3 Judge Adams states
that "the question for the definition of religion for [F]irst [A]mendment
purposes is one for the courts, and is not controlled by the subjective
perceptions of the believers."84 This case has the unique distinction of
being "the first appellate court decision ... that has concluded that a set of
ideas constitutes a religion over the objection and protestations of secularity
by those espousing those ideas." 5 In similar spirit, Womens Services v.
Thone"6 concluded that "the mere labeling of something as coming within
a 'religious' area by theologians does not serve to make that area 'religious'
for purposes of invoking First Amendment protections."'7 The Supreme
Court perhaps disagrees with that last statement - although freely
expressing its preference not to be cornered into adjudicating such questions,
it has also not yet ruled that personal labels of a belief as "religious" are
beyond challenge - but it clearly agrees with its converse: Even if the court
should not lightly contradict a claim of religiousness, it clearly can
contradict one of nonreligiousness.88
Two other well-established precedents go a long way toward limiting
Free Exercise challenges by distinguishing between types of beliefs. The
9
professed belief must not be simply religious; it must also be sincere and
specific.9" On the other hand, beliefs are not required to be shared by an
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

592 F.2d 197 (3d Cir. 1979).
Id. at 199.
Id. at 200.
483 F. Supp. 1022 (D. Neb. 1979).
Id. at 1040.
Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 341 (1970) provides:
The Court's statement in Seeger that a registrant's characterization of his

own belief as "religious" should carry great weight, 380 U.S. at 184, does
not imply that his declaration that his views are nonreligious should be

treated similarly. When a registrant states that his objections to war are
"religious," that information is highly relevant to the question of the
function his beliefs have in his life. But very few registrants are fully
aware of the broad scope of the word "religious" as used in §6(j), and
accordingly a registrant's statement that his beliefs are nonreligious is a
highly unreliable guide for those charged with administering the exemption.
89. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944). A recent application of this standard
is to be found in Brown-El v. Harris,26 F.3d 68 (8th Cir. 1994). Although it does not refer
to Ballard,it does invoke the sincerity standard. A Muslim inmate was removed from the
list of those eligible for the special Ramadan fast meal schedule because he broke the fast of
his own accord. The circuit court found no violation of his Free Exercise rights. By
implication, the prison is not obligated to respect beliefs which the prisoner himself does not
highly regard, that is, those which are held lightly and not sincerely. Id. at 69.
90. Jimmy Swaggert Ministries v. Board of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378. In this case,
"the Court assumed that burdens on religion are of no constitutional significance unless they
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organization, even one which the individual claims to belong to and which
is the purported source of the belief.9' Nor need they be "acceptable,
logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others."92

require the church or the believer to violate a particular doctrinal tenet." Laycock, RFRA,
supra note i1, at 240; cf Laycock, Remnants, supra note 9, at 23-24.
This conclusion may be seen as a logical extension of the normal presumption that
"an individual asserting a constitutional claim must have suffered a personal, concreteinjury
that would be remediable by judicial process," Esbeck, supra note 20, at 587 n. 19 (emphasis
added). This change derived from the language of Article III of the U.S. Constitution. Ira
C. Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The Problem of Burdens on the Free ExerciseofReligion, 102
HARV. L. REv. 933, 960 (1989). "[C]ourts are to refrain from 'abstract questions' which
amount to 'generalized grievances' shared by many others. Esbeck, supra note 20, at 615
n. 130. "Concrete" would lead one to expect that a specific governmental action must abut
a specific (and specifiable) religious doctrine before a First Amendment claim would be
warranted.
One case which invokes the principle of tenet specificity is Riely v. Reno, 860 F.
Supp. 693 (D. Ariz. 1994). The Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act of 1994
("FACE") punishes those who interfere with a person's attempt to avail herself of health
services by such actions as blocking easy egress and threatening the patient. Abortion
protesters claimed that FACE violated their free religious exercise by not permitting them to
engage in these harassing behaviors. However, the court ruled that the protesters "failed to
allege that their religion advocates the use of force or threats of force or the use of physical
obstruction to make passage to a facility unreasonably difficult or hazardous." Riely, 860 F.
Supp. at 709.
The requirement that the religious belief be specific and specifiable is somewhat
different from the issue that it be explicitly specified. The distinction is that, while the belief
should be precise and articulable, there is question whether it need be compelled. The
original author of RFRA "refrained from limiting the Act to actions which are 'compelled'
or 'motivated' by religion, leaving to the courts the job of determining, on a case-by-case
basis, whether or not a particular practice is indeed an exercise of religion. [He] also
expressed his opinion that an activity merely 'permitted' by one's religion would not be
entitled to protection under the RFRA." Jaasma, supra note 30, at 285 n.468. Clearly, if a
hierarchy is to be developed, religiously compulsory behaviors are to be better protected than
religiously optional ones.
91. Frazee v. Illinois Dept. of Employment Security, 489 U.S. 829 (1989) (belief can
be personal and not allied with an organization); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981)
(belief can deviate from those held by other members of the religious organization).
92. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 714. The effect of Thomas in practice would be to preserve
the right of idiosyncratic belief systems to claim religious exemption, although the burden
of proving the religious nature of those beliefs might be higher in those instances: "One can,
of course, imagine an asserted claim so bizarre, so clearly nonreligious in motivation, as not
to be entitled to protection." Id. at 715. While seemingly a weakness, this interpretation is
actually more generous than others proposed, including that of Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205 (1972), which requires an organizational or historical dimension to a claim before it
could be recognized as religious. This interpretive strategy could easily exclude altogether
individual claims for religious protection.

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 17

Any particular religious belief is but one part of a larger religious
system - or if the term "system" is precluded by the requirement that
beliefs not be necessarily logical, at the very least a particular belief at issue
is only one member of a collection of related beliefs. Not all parts/members
of these systems/collections are of equal kind.
One social scientifically oriented approach partitions religious
phenomena into four parts: Ethical Action, Worship, Faith, and Therapy.93
Faith and Therapy should be absolutely protected by the free exercise
clause, and the worship subsystem should also be protected so long as there
is no demonstrable harm outside of the worship group or severe physical
injury within it, and the ethical action subsystem should receive a much
lesser degree of protection. 94
By this standard, observing the Mass (if you are Catholic) and refusing
medical care for one's self (if you are Christian Scientist) should never be
infringed upon. 95 But snake-handling, because it is a worship feature
which threatens "severe physical harm" within the group, may not be
beyond the reach of legal action. 96
Even less secure would be claims to discriminate against others, such
as refusing to rent to a gay couple, since these are ethical actions. Ethics
determines how man relates himself to other men; religion principally
concerns itself with morality, which is how man responds to god. While
ethics and morals are connected, they are not identical, and the protections
for religious morals should not extend in their entirety to embrace ethics as
well. This qualification is at the heart of the third proposed limiting
principle, discussed below.
Even Smith recognizes gradations of religious behavior: "the practice
of throwing rice at church weddings" ought not be protected to the same
extent as is "the practice of getting married in church."97 Yet the proposal
here is to require the investigation into centrality which some suggest was
rendered unconstitutional by Smith. 98
93. Joseph M. Dodge II, The Free ExerciseofReligion: A SociologicalApproach,67
MiCH. L. REV. 679 (1969).
94. Id. at 697.

95. Refusing medical care to others, however, could well infringe upon the third
limiting principle, discussed below. See infra subsection C and accompanying text.
96. This contradicts McConnell's proposition that governmental action should not
extend to protecting people from the consequences of their religious choices. McConnell,

Neutrality,supra note 32.

97. Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 887 n.4

(1990).
98. The "strongest reading of... Smith is that it may verge on unconstitutional for a
court to inquire into the substantiality of an alleged burden on religious exercise." Idleman,
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Explicitly, Free Exercise protections should be granted maximally to
the central religious tenets of the individual. Derivative beliefs should enjoy
some measure of deference by governmental bodies, but less so than the
core doctrines.
Looking for the moment at conventional Christianity, there is a
presumption that any belief or practice specified in the Apostle's Creed is
intrinsic to the faith. Transgression upon or denial of any of these mandated
tenets would not be a mere inconvenience, but would threaten the cult
utterly. By any understanding of the terms, these tenets are "central" to the
religion, and should be maximally protected.
On the other hand, most Christians have other beliefs which, while
derived from, are not as central to the core religious convictions. Christmas
trees are a common symbol of the religion, but nowhere are Christians
enjoined as to their erection. Such derivative or motivated beliefs and
practices would surely fare differently under judicial scrutiny than would the
central religious tenets.99 A law forbidding the practice - imagine a
scenario wherein the environmental damage caused by the seasonal mass
cutting and then, later, discarding of innumerable pine trees into already
overtaxed landfills required a cessation of the use of live trees - such a law
should stimulate only the mildest First Amendment objections.

supra note 25, at 273-274. Since any deliberation about burden implies a weighing of
relative importance, by implication the Court "suggested that the fundamental enterprise of
examining and weighing the individual importance of religious claims [i.e., which are central
and which are not] should not be part of the judicial decisionmaking process at all." Id.
99. This essay thus disagrees with Professor Laycock's characterization of noncentral
beliefs:
[F]or many believers, the attempt to distinguish what is required [or central]
from what grows organically out of the religious experience is an utterly
alien question, perhaps a nonsensical and unanswerable question, certainly
a question that reflects failure to comprehend much of their faith and
experience.
Laycock, Remnants, supra note 9, at 26. On the contrary, just as he expects judges to be
able to constitutionally distinguish between the "soldier who believes he must cover his head
before an omnipresent God ... from a soldier who wants to wear a Budweiser gimme cap,"
(id. at 11), so too should the same judges be able to draw a line between observances of the
Catholic Eucharist and Easter egg hunts.
In fact, the erection of Christmas trees has recently become the focus of a Free
Exercise claim. Fire officials in a New Jersey township warned local clergy not to erect trees
in their sanctuaries unless they were equipped with adequate sprinkler systems to combat
possible blazes. An affronted Presbyterian minister charged that this restriction infringed his
First Amendment protections. David Gibson, W. Milford Sees Fire Hazard in Churches'
Tradition, THE RECORD (Northern New Jersey) Dec. 6, 1996, at Al. By the standards
articulated here, such suits are trivial and should fail.
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Legal commentators are divided among themselves over the centrality
requirement. While most concede that it would be a very complex standard
to apply, only some regard it as a desideratum.' °
The limiting principle so baldly stated, we can now consider in detail
Smith's objections:

100. The divergence in opinion among experts can be illustrated by the following
excerpts:
Distinguishing between various kinds of burdens on religion ... can also
reflect a justifiable effort to weight the strength of the religious interest, as
well as the government interest, as part of the overall process of "balancing." It seems sensible to require stronger reasons to justify a severe effect
on religious freedom, and less to justify a minor effect.
Unfortunately, it is often difficult for courts to calibrate effects on
religious practice, because an important part of that calculus - how
important is the practice to the believer or church? - is essentially a
theological question beyond the competence or authority of judges.
Berg, supra note 11, at 51-52. It may be noted that "competence" is altogether a different
issue from "authority." Courts routinely rule on issues with which they have no direct
competence. Science and technology questions are regularly considered, as are appraisals of
mental health of defendants. When competence is an issue, courts normally rely upon expert
testimony rather than ruling the matter to be outside the reach of law. Michael McConnell,
Free ExerciseRevisionism, supra note 12, at 1144, also goes on the "pro centrality" side.
Laycock, Remnants, supra note 9, at 32, shares Berg's pessimism that such a
standard could be constructed, but differs in his view that even if it could, it should not be
used:
A threshold requirement of centrality would indeed be a mistake, both
under-inclusive and unworkable. It would be under-inclusive because all
religious practices are part of free exercise, and not just those the Court
finds central. It would be unworkable because religious centrality is a
continuous variable. It cannot be converted into a dichotomous variable,
controlling a discontinuous leap from no protection at all to the compelling
interest test, without producing distortion, error, and indefensible differences in result.
On the one hand, it can be seen here that Laycock is himself resorting to the sort of argument
he ridiculed Justice Stevens for espousing, namely, that if we cannot guarantee flawless
outcomes, the strategy should not be applied. "Even-handed repression" is to be preferred
to "imperfect liberty." Id. at 14.
Both of Laycock's objections can be met if we accept his point that centrality is a
continuum. Central beliefs are protected most and best, less central beliefs less so and less
completely, but they are never without protections entirely. The standards for infringing on
the first should be higher and tougher than those impinging upon the second. But since
Laycock himself feels comfortable referring to some beliefs as "central," it seems reasonable
to suppose that courtroom judges can do as much. Id. at 30.
Lupu, Where Rights Begin, supra note 90, at 959, is also against use of a centrality
standard, as is CHOPER, SECURING RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note 19, at 71.
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Nor is it possible to limit the impact of respondents'
proposal by requiring a "compelling state interest" only
when the conduct prohibited is "central" to the
individual's religion. [Citations omitted] It is no more
appropriate for judges to determine the "centrality" of
religious beliefs before applying a "compelling interest"
test in the free exercise field, than it would be for them to
determine the "importance" of ideas before applying the
"compelling interest" test in the free speech field. What
principle of law or logic can be brought to bear to
contradict a believer's assertion that a particular act is
"central" to his personal faith? Judging the centrality of
different religious practices is akin to the unacceptable
"business of evaluating the relative merits of differing
religious claims." [Citation omitted] As we reaffirmed
only last Term, "[i]t is not within the judicial ken to
question the centrality of particular beliefs or practices to
a faith, or the validity of a particular litigant's interpretations of those creeds.' 0'
But that same case from the previous term, Hernandez v. Commissioner,02
was cited by Swaggert0 3 to support precisely the opposite point: "Our
cases have established that '[t]he free exercise inquiry asks whether the
government has placed a substantial burden on the observation of a central
religious belief or practice.'"9°*
101. Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources, v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 886-887
(1990) (citation omitted).
The Court had earlier spoken against "centrality" tests in Widmar v. Vincent, 454
U.S. 263, 269-270 (1981), and in Lyng v. Northwest Indian CemeteryProtectiveAss'n,
485
U.S. 439 (1988). The expressed fear in the latter was that the Court might have to contradict
claims to religious centrality, requiring it "to rule that some religious adherents misunderstand
their own religious beliefs." Id. at 457-58. But Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 341
(1970) (quoted supra note 88) has already established the precedent that the Supreme Court
is free to interpret a person's religious beliefs even in ways that contradict that person's own
characterization of those beliefs. In his dissent to Lyng, Justice Brennan speaks in favor of
a showing of centrality. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 458-77.
102. 490 U.S. 680 (1989).
103. Jimmy Swaggert Ministries v. Board of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378 (1990).
104. Id. at 384 (emphasis added). This quotation actually refers to two limitations, that
the belief be central, and that the burden be substantial. The two are not unrelated, since the
centrality of a belief would necessarily be a variable to consider when estimating whether a
burden is substantial. Separate consideration is not given herein to the concept of
"substantial." Cases which discussthis topic include Smith v. FairEmployment and Housing
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Despite the protestations of Smith, this type of "inquiry.. .is not without
Wisconsin v. Yoder is often cited in this context: Amish
precedent."' '
parents were exempted from compulsory school attendance laws for their
children in part because a "life aloof from the world and its values is central
to their faith.' 0 6
Lower courts, too, have been known to tread into precisely this
allegedly forbidden territory. In Northwest Indian Cemetery ProtectiveAssn.
v. Peterson, °7 the Yurok, Karok, and Tolowa Indians objected to plans by
the U.S. Forest Service for logging projects in the Blue Creek Unit, an area
with religious significance for these peoples. At that time, the court ruled
That the Indians use the Blue Creek high country area for
religious purposes and consider the area sacred is not
enough to characterize the contemplated Forest Service
actions as a burden on free exercise rights. The Indians
have to show that the area at issue is indispensable and
central to their religious practices and beliefs.'0
In other words, to secure the desired protections the tribes must
demonstrate to the court's satisfaction that the beliefs and practices focusing
on the Blue Creek area are more like the Mass than like Christmas trees.
Another case which seemed to apply a centrality test was Brandon v.
Board of Education. 9 Students were not allowed to conduct prayer
meetings in public school immediately before the school day commenced.
The Second Circuit court of appeals held that such refusal did not breach the
Free Exercise rights of the students."0 Factoring into the court's decision
was the purely voluntary nature of the prayer meeting. Because the worship
was not religiously compelled, accommodation was not required. The
outcome might have been otherwise had the court been faced with "a
Moslem who must prostrate himself five times daily in the direction of
Mecca."'

Commission, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d 700, 714, 723 (1996); Idleman, supra note 25, at 265-274,

also delves into the concept of the substantial burden, as does Lupu, supra note 90.
105. Sanchez, supra note 24, at 58.
106. 406 U.S. 205, 210 (1972).
107. 795 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1986).
108. Id. at 692 (emphasis added).
109. 635 F.2d 971 (1980).
110. Id. at 980. I would have decided this otherwise. Douglas Laycock also disagrees
with this result, although he is a tad sarcastic in his tone. Douglas Laycock, Free Exercise
and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 62 FoRDHAM L. REV. 883, 893 (1994).
111. Brandon, 635 F.2d at 977.
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What these cases demonstrate is that, whatever the objection to
considering the "centrality" of a belief, it cannot be based on a claim that
such has never been done. The proposal here is not to initiate a new
inquiry, but rather only to require what courts at all levels have at times
undertaken of their own initiative.
2. Example: Allegheny County
Can judges handle weighing the religious significance of a specific
religious practice? The several cases cited above suggest that in principle,
at least, courts are not completely reticent to tackle the problem. Ironically,
the very source of strongest warning against the enterprise also provides one
of the most explicit demonstrations of its practice.
The Supreme Court has discussed in surprising detail the place of
Christmas trees in American religious life. County ofAllegheny v. American
Civil Liberties Union, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter,'2 resolved the wellknown dispute over whether public display of creches and menorahs at
Christmas time constitutes an unconstitutional establishment. The court
ruled that the creche, displayed alone, framed by a floral arbor, and installed
in the most significant architectural feature of the County Courthouse, did
indeed constitute an illegal establishment of religion. On the other hand, the
menorah in conjunction with a Christmas tree was not, since the conjunction
of the two served only as a permissible governmental acknowledgment of
the holiday season and its origins, without showing undue preference or
endorsement.
In this context the religious significance of the Christmas tree is
pivotal. If it is minimally religious or even purely secular in meaning, then
the tree can serve to "dilute" the religious implications of the menorah. If,
on the other hand, the Christmas tree is an important part of Christian
religion, then its use with the Jewish symbol would be a case of multiple
establishment, reinforcing rather than diluting the religious message. Three
of the four opinions thus agonize over the place of Christmas trees within
Christianity.
Justice Blackmun suggested that "[a]lthough Christmas trees once
carried religious connotations, today they typify the secular celebration of
Christmas."... 3 This view of the tree "serves to emphasize the secular
component of the message communicated by other elements of an accompa-

112. 492 U.S. 573, 573-75 (1989).
113. Id. at 616.
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nying holiday display, including the Chanukah menorah.""' 4 The display
is thus constitutional.
Justice O'Connor also had no problem with the joint display.

"[W]hatever its origins, [the Christmas tree] is not regarded as a religious

symbol.... A Christmas tree displayed in front of city hall, in my view,
cannot fairly be understood as conveying government endorsement of

Christianity."' " 5

Justice Brennan, however, is more skeptical. In his view, "this attempt
to take the 'Christmas' out of the Christmas tree is unconvincing... 6 He
aptly demonstrates that despite O'Connor's attempt to secularize the tree,
her analysis actually presupposes its continued religious significance." 7
To him, the display is an obvious attempt at an unconstitutional establishment.

Christmas trees have their historical roots in pagan Europe, becoming

incorporated into Christian practices beginning as recently as Medieval
Germany." 8 Consequently, the tree is neither uniquely Christian (other

religions use or used them), nor is it even thoroughly Christian (first

millennia Christians would not recognize the practice). If the Christmas tree
is a religious symbol, it is not a very strong one, and certainly not a
provocatively Christian one.

114. Id. at 617.
115. Id. at 633.
116. Id. at 639.

117. Id. at 639-640:
The notion that the Christmas tree is necessarily secular is, indeed, so
shaky that, despite superficial acceptance of the idea, Justice O'Connor does
not really take it seriously. While conceding that the "menorah standing
alone at city hall may well send" a message of endorsement of the Jewish
faith, she nevertheless concludes: "By accompanying its display of a
Christmas tree - a secular symbol of the Christmas holiday season- with
a salute to liberty, and by adding a religious symbol from a Jewish holiday
also celebrated at roughly the same time of year, I conclude that the city
did not endorse Judaism or religion in general, but rather conveyed a
message of pluralism and freedom of belief during the holiday season."
But the "pluralism" to which Justice O'Connor refers is religiouspluralism,
and the "freedom of belief' she emphasizes is freedom of religiousbelief.
The display of the tree and the menorah will symbolize such pluralism and
freedom only if more than one religion is represented; if only Judaism is

represented, the scene is about Judaism, not about pluralism. Thus, the
pluralistic message Justice O'Connor stresses depends on the tree's
possessing some religious significance. Id. (citations omitted).
118. COMPTON's LIVING ENCYCLOPEDIA, "Christmas: Trees and Decorations," via
American On Line, Keyword: Compton's Encyclopedia.
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For these reasons, we would have to reject Justice Brennan's outlook
on the tree. And if his analysis is correct, and Justice O'Connor's use of the
tree presupposes an understanding of its religiosity despite her overt
statements to the contrary, then we must reject her perspective as well.
Justice Blackmun, then, seems to have the most valid understanding of the
Christmas tree. If it is not wholly secular, it is of generic and minimal
religiosity at most.
What matters to us here is not to ascertain the status of the Christmas
tree. Rather, we wish to draw attention to the fact that the justices engaged
themselves to determine whether the use of the tree constitutes a central
religious practice. As Allegheny County illustrates, the Supreme Court
Justices have established clear precedent for evaluating the religious
significance of individual beliefs, despite their disingenuous protestations to
the contrary in Smith. At least one author has concluded that whatever the
excuses offered in Smith, "the examination of the 'centrality' of a religious
belief in determining whether religious exercise is 'substantially burdened'
will likely have to be made by judges under RFRA." ' 9 The proposed
limiting principle suggests only that this endeavor be accepted more
consistently and more forthrightly.
C. DEMANDS ON THE SELF ARE BETTER PROTECTED THAN THOSE ON OTHERS

1. Rationale

The definition of religion as discussed above entails that religion is an
affair of the individual. The professed beliefs of an individual will often
make demands so that he or she will be "right with God." The price of
fulfilling these demands range from the minimal, involving no more than
occasional inconvenience, to the genuinely costly in terms of either money
or life and career opportunities.
Within a pluralistic society, it seems imminently reasonable to require
that the costs of fulfilling religious demands be borne entirely by the
individual seeking to thereby procure divine favor for him- or herself.
Citizens should not be unwillingly 2 . conscripted into the salvation projects
119. Jaasma, supra note 30, at 286. Professor McConnell also expresses confidence in
the ability ofthejudicial bench to make the relevant centrality discriminations without unduly
"second-guessing religious doctrine." McConnell, Free ExerciseRevisionism, supra note 12,
at 1144.
120. "Unwilling" is a pivotal qualification. There is a sense in which members who join
a religious organization should not later complain if they find decisions or actions within that
organization to be disagreeable or disadvantageous personally. The Supreme Court
acknowledged this limitation when it observed that "All who unite themselves to such a[n
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of others. The First Amendment, therefore, should not protect practices

which impose costs or curtail liberties of someone other than the believer.
"Religion might influence how people behaved in all areas of their lives.
But what they did in the name of God had no claims upon their neighbor's
conscience.""''
Should I as a legitimate creditor go without repayment so you can tithe
your church?.22 Should an inmate be allowed to place at risk an entire
correctional facility because his religious beliefs prevent him from taking a
standard test for tuberculosis? 23 Should children be required to listen to

Christian proselytizing over the school loudspeaker?'24 Can an employer

ecclesiastical] body do so with an implied consent to this government, and are bound to
submit to it." Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 729 (1871); see McConnell, Free
ExerciseRevisionism, supra note 12, at 1145. While such a willing adherent has given up
much, I am unwilling to assume that s/he should be without any'civil recourse against all
actions by religious bodies.
For instance, Rayburn v. General Conferenceof Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d
1164 (4th Cir. 1985), found that while religious institutions may base employment decisions
upon religious preferences, they were not exempt from the 1964 Civil Rights Act
proscriptions against discrimination by race, sex, or national origins, for non-ministerial
positions.
121. ISAAC KRAMNICK & R. LAURENCE MOORE, THE GODLESS CONSTITUTION: THE
CASE AGAINST RELIGIOUS CORRECTNESS 61 (1996).

122. Steven Hopkins, Is God a PreferredCreditor?Tithing as an Avoidable Transfer
in Chapter 7 Bankruptcies,62 U. CHI. L. REv. 1139 (1995). Hopkins believes that tithing
should be a protected religious activity; the proposed limiting principle would recommend
a different outcome.
123. James C. McKinley, Jr., IsolationEndsfor PrisonerWho Refused Testingfor TB,
N.Y. TIMES, August 22, 1995, at B5.
124. 60 Minutes, supra note 33; Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
It is the threat of wrangling captive audiences into unwelcome religious displays
which lay behind the NCAA's abortive effort to prevent football players for Jerry Falwell's
Liberty University from kneeling in prayer to celebrate touchdowns. At first glance, this
seems like an unnecessary intrusion into spontaneous expressions of gratitude to the players'
God during moments of sporting exuberance. But, as is often the case, the players freely
admit that the demonstration was directed not at God, but at the spectators. The NCAA
should have "stuck to its guns" and forbidden this attempt to evangelize fans.
"Players may pray or cross themselves without drawing attention to
themselves," said Vince Dooley, chairman of the NCAA football rules
committee. "It is also permissible for them to kneel momentarily at the
conclusion of play if, in the judgment of the official, the act is spontaneous
and not in the nature of a pose.
However, the "pose" is exactly what Liberty and other religious schools
and individuals want. Nobody ever banned prayer from the football field
- or from schools, for that matter. It is only the visible demonstration of
prayer that causes problems.
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require workers to attend devotional services at the workplace because he
made a pledge to God to do so if his business prospered?' 25 Should a
school be permitted to practice racial discrimination and still receive federal
funding? 1 6 Probably iiot. All of these instances buy divine salvation for
the practitioner by inflicting costs and burdens on others. I reject any
obligation to pay for your earthly home; so much the less should I have to
subsidize your heavenly one.
This principle is, like all the others, not new to legal scholarship.
James Madison's original formulation provided that 'free exercise should be
protected 'in every case where it does not trespass on private rights or the
public peace.' This means that we are free to practice our religions so long
as we do not injure others.""' The influential Judge Learned Hand wrote
that "The First Amendment . . . gives no one the right to insist that in
pursuit of their own interests others must conform their conduct to his own
religious necessities. ' One of the intended' exceptions to RFRA is that
"the practice in question [should not] cause[] a direct, individualized harm
to specifically identifiable, non-consenting thirdparties."'29
2. Examples: Yang and Smith v. FEHC
Were this proposed limiting principle in place, it would have significantly factored into the outcome of at least two cases. The first, Yang v.
Sturner,"3 ° drew some attention to itself when the judge so clearly expressed his regret that he could not rule against the state.
In this case, Rhode Island's medical examiner performed an autopsy
upon the body of deceased youth. Unfortunately, he was the son of a
Hmong couple, whose religious beliefs proscribe mutilation of the body.
The judge originally ruled in favor of the couple in their quest for damages
based in part upon their perceived violation of their Free Exercise rights, but
later, in light of Smith, he felt that he had no choice but to rule against
them.

"I want the kids across America to look at me and know that I have a
higher power, and that's God," said Liberty's quarterback, Antwan Chiles.
George Vecsey, Sports of the Times; The Seasons and Symbols Butt Heads, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 3, 1995, §8, at 1.
125. EEOC v. Townley Eng'g & Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 610 (9th Cir. 1988).
126. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
127. McConnell, FreeExercise Revisionism, supra note 12, at 1128.
128. Otten v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 205 F.2d 58, 61 (2nd Cir. 1953).
129. Berg, supra note 11, at 5 (emphasis added).
130. 728 F. Supp. 845 (D.R.I. 1990); 750 F. Supp. 558 (D.R.I. 1990).
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The limiting principle would apply in this way: The record of the case
specifically states that the religious beliefs were those of the parents, and
not of the son. 3 ' I would interpret this to mean that the parents incurred
no Free Exercise injuries by the autopsy on their son. Had the parents
argued that they were pressing to respect the religious wishes of the son,
rather than their own, that would make a difference. This does not mean
that the parents are without any rights at all. The opinion points out that
"[s]urviving kin possess a 'quasi-property' right in the body of the
and injuries could be pressed under this claim. The limiting
deceased,'
principle, however, would hold that they endured no Free Exercise
violations.' 33
The second example also illustrates the limiting principle at work. In
Smith v. FairEmployment and Housing Commission,' a landlord, Evelyn
Smith, refused to rent to unmarried heterosexual couples because she
believed that to do so would abet their acts of fornication for which God
would hold her accountable. A couple denied a rental sued under the state
antidiscrimination provisions which included marital status as a protected
category.
The state district court found for Smith, ruling that the statute
prohibiting discrimination was unconstitutional as applied to the landlord."' The California Supreme Court overturned this decision, finding
that she could not prevail regardless of whether the Smith or RFRA
standards were applied. The Court seems to apply reasoning akin to that
suggested here: "[T]he landlord's request for an accommodation in the case
before us has a serious impact on the rights and interests of third parties."' 3 6 The involvement of others distinguished the case from the well131. For example, the first sentence of the original decision begins, "This sad case pits
You Vang Yang and la Kue Yang, a couple whose deeply-held religious beliefs prohibit the
mutilation of the body through an autopsy..." 728 F. Supp. 845, 846 (1990). Nowhere
is it stated whether the dead son shared these religious beliefs.
132. Id.at 851.
133. Similar reasoning allows the result that while adults may withhold medical
treatment from themselves, or from other like-minded adults, they +wnnot do so with minor
children when such withholding results in injury or death. "Parents may be free to become
martyrs themselves. But it does not follow they arefree, in identical circumstances, to make
martyrs of their children before they have reached the age of full legal discretion when they
can make that choice for themselves. . . . If parents are not at liberty to 'martyr' children
by taking their labor, it follows a fortiori that they are not at liberty to martyr children by
taking their very lives." Walker v. Superior Court, 763 P.2d 852, 870 (Cal. 1988) (quoting
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944)).
134. 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d 700 (1996).
135. 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 395 (Cal. App. 3 Dist. 1994).
136. 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d 700, 716 (1996).

1996]

RESTORING FREE EXERCISE PROTECTIONS

known unemployment compensation cases, such as Sherbert' and
Thomas,'38 where granting religious accommodation did not exact costs
from identifiable third party individuals. "Indeed, the notion that an
accommodation might affect the rights of third parties led the Supreme
Court in Wisconsin v. Yoder'39 expressly to limit its holding to avoid such
an implication."' 40 A argument similar to Smith's was likewise rejected
in Alaska.' 4' Justice Thomas dissented when the United States Supreme
Court denied certiorari. 42 The California case addressed the issues in the
order laid out by the Sherbert test. That court found first that no RFRA
relief was available because the burden upon her religious practice was not
substantial, and thus there was no need to consider whether the state had a
compelling interest in declining to exempt her from the generally applicable
antidiscrimination laws. Thomas does not consider this prior issue of
burden. Instead, he leaps immediately and prematurely to the "compelling
interest" standard for state action. Finding that Alaska has no such level of
interest in the prevention of marital status discrimination, he believed that,
at the least, the Court should have heard the case, if not overturned the prior

ruling. 141

137. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
138. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
139. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
140. 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d 700, 718 (1996).
141. Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274 (Alaska 1994).
142. Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. 460 (1994) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
143. The implication is that there is aheirarchy of interests in preventing discrimination
based upon various attributes. Race and sex discriminations are arguably more pressing states'
interests than that against marital status, even if all are treated equally in civil rights
legislation. The distinction rests upon the history of actual discriminatory practices which
preceded those laws. A "compelling state interest" in preventing a discriminatory practice is
therefore demonstrated by the joint facts that the practice is actually criminalized, and that
a history of actual discrimination exists. While race, sex and marital status all meet the legal
requirement, marital status discrimination lacks a prevalent social history, hence Justice
Thomas' suggestion that it might fail to rise to the level of a compelling state interest.
This approach becomes particularly pivotal for the question of discrimination by
sexual orientation. First, it could be argued that because there is no national policy or laws
to discourage this practice, state or local ordinances to that effect would reflect at most that
body's interest that all citizens be evaluated according only to their relevant merits. But such
a general goal does not rise to the level of a "compelling interest" capable of deflecting a

Free Exercise challenge. See Mark Kohler, Equal Employment or ExcessiveEntanglement?
The Application of Employment DiscriminationStatutes to Religiously Affiliated Organizations, 18 CoNN. L.R. 581, 618 (1986).
Many opponents of equal rights for gays and lesbians also challenge the assertion that
these people have a pervasive social experience of discrimination and economic disadvantage.
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These cases demonstrate that while existing legal rules can yield similar
results to that of the proposed limiting principle, they do so unreliably and
with fragile outcome. The landlord should be denied not because her
burden is not substantial, but because she cannot, and must not be allowed
to pave her road to heaven with the lives and rights of independent fellow

citizens.

D. FREE EXERCISE YIELDS TO ESTABLISHMENT CONCERNS

1. Rationale
The two clauses within the First Amendment pertaining to religion are
tightly entwined, although the precise relationship of one to the other is
controversial. For some, they are in fundamental contradiction: the
accommodations required by the Free Exercise Clause are forbidden by the
Establishment Clause.'

For others, the relationship is more congenial,

the one ending where the other begins. 4 5

E.g., Defense of Marriage Act, Hearing on H.R. 3396 Before the Subcomm. on the
Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 2nd Sess. 236 (1996)
(Statement by Rep. Inglis). In their eyes, the failure to meet the second criterion to establish
a compelling state interest would permit Free Exercise challenges to laws preventing sexual
orientation discrimination (provided, of course, that the "substantial burden" proof had
already been met).
For a contrary analysis, describing why anti-discrimination laws protecting gays and
lesbians are probably immune from most Free Exercise challenges, see David B. Cruz, Piety
and Prejudice: Free Exercise Exemption from Laws Prohibiting Sexual Orientation
Discrimination,69NYU L.R. 1176 (1994).
144. Cf. School Dis. of Abington Township, Pa., v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,247 (1963)
(Brennan, J., concurring); Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, Comptroller of Public Accounts
of Texas, 489 U.S. 1, 26 (1989) (Blackmun, J., concurring); Jesse H. Choper, The Religion
Clauses of the FirstAmendment: Reconcilingthe Conflict, 41 U. PITr. L. REV. 673 (1980);
Marshall, supra note 12, at 320.
145. The "free exercise principle defines the limits of the anti-establishment principle.
One begins where the other ends." Jonathan E. Nuechterlein, The Free ExerciseBoundaries
of PermissibleAccommodationunder the EstablishmentClause, 99 YALE L. J. 1127, 1146
(1990). But see County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989), which suggests that
the two clauses do not perfectly abut one another, instead creating a gap. "[W]e have never
held that government's power to accommodate and recognize religion extends no further than
the requirements of the Free Exercise Clause. To the contrary, '[t]he limits of permissible
state accommodation to religion are by no means coextensive with the non-interference
mandated by the Free Exercise Clause."' Id. at 663 n.2 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
According to Carl Esbeck, "the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses must be
construed as never in contradiction." Esbeck, supra note 20, at 594 (emphasis added).
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So intimately are the two clauses related, that any complaint based on
one can be rephrased into the other. 4 6 The Christmas creche case of
Allegheny County, for instance, was technically argued as an establishment
case. However, at several points the Justices address the idea that the
display could be argued to be a permissible Free Exercise accommoda47
tion. 1
Given the dual influence of the clauses on any particular set of facts,

it becomes important to decide beforehand which concerns should ordinarily

"trump" the other. "The Rehnquist-Scalia wing [of the Supreme Court]
subordinates the establishment clause to the free-exercise clause in an effort
to accommodate the interests of religion."' 48 In practice, this means that
the state may risk appearing to endorse or approve religion - almost
certainly mainstream Christianity - if such establishments will ease the
observances of the faithful. As applied, Scalia would permit the state to
preferentially exempt religious publications (and only religious publications)
from sale taxes. 49 This frees the religious organization in their efforts at
proselytization, but risks the appearance of government endorsement,
approval and encouragement of that evangelism.
The prioritization of Free Exercise over Establishment explains some
odd outcomes and even odder justifications for those outcomes within
American jurisprudence. Consider the convenient relationship between the
regulated rhythms of secular and economic life and the Christian calendar
of religious observances. Outside the strictures of legal minutiae,5 0 it is
146. "The reverse side of an 'establishment' is a burden on the 'free exercise' of
-religion." McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 578 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Professor Laycock "find[s] it implausible that a burden on religion might violate the
Establishment Clause,... when it does not also violate the Free Exercise Clause." Laycock,
Remnants, supra note 9, at 53. Thus, one court complained that the "plaintiffs' claim that the
[zoning] code violates the Establishment Clause is merely a repackaging of the free exercise
count to fit another constitutional label." Daytona Rescue Mission, Inc. v. City of Daytona
Beach, 885 F. Supp. 1554, 1560 (M.D. Fla. 1995).
147. See County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 601 n.51, 613 n.59. The main opinion
discounts the accommodation perspective. This interpretation had been asserted by Justice
Kennedy in a separate opinion. Id. at 663 n.2 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
148. LEVY, supranote 65, at 159. See Texas Monthly, Inc., 489 U.S. at 27 (Blackmun,
J., concurring).
149. See Texas Monthly, Inc., 489 U.S. at 29-33 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
150. "Sometimes the justices make distinctions that would glaze the minds of medieval
scholastics." LEVY, supra note 65, at 155.
It doesn't help when the arcane distinctions being made are conveniently invoked
rather than meticulously and consistently applied. For instance, when considering the Sunday
Closing laws, the appellants urge the Court to consider the legislator's motives as being
fundamentally religious. The laws were originally clearly so, and the modification of the
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difficult for the reasonable man not to see an unfair establishment in the
state's orchestrating a day of rest which coincides with the Christian
Sabbath. Legally penalizing those who break it transgresses the Establishment Clause,' 5 ' while refusing to accommodate those whose Sabbaths fall
on other days and are thereby required to cease business enterprises for two
days a week, one for religious, the other for legal reasons, violates the Free
Exercise Clause. 5 ' But on both points the Supreme Court has ruled
otherwise, relying on a supposed overwhelming state interest in the
legislative mandate of a uniform day of rest. 5 But even if that were true,
that does not explain why it needs to be Sunday.'54 Setting the day of
economic rest as Tuesday'55 would achieve this alleged governmental
objective of high importance without unduly favoring any religion. )
surface language does little to obscure or alter this original legislative intent. But Justice
Frankfurter eschews such analysis, saying that "the private and unformulated influences which
may work upon legislation are not open to judicial probing." McGowan v. Maryland, 366
U.S. 420, 469 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). That would seem to leave the explicit
textual language as the focus of constitutional scrutiny.
However, when that overt language clearly reveals the religious fundaments of the
Sunday Closing laws, then Frankfurter recommends that the language be disregarded, and
instead the unstated intentions of legislators be intuitively reconstructed from indirect
evidence. Id. at 497-505. He feels that interpretation of no constitutional clause "demands
logical tidiness," and it shows. See id. at 524.
151. Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown, Inc., v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961).
152. See generallyBraunfeldv. Brown 366 U.S. 599 (1961). Such exemptions are said
to "impede the effective operation of the Sunday statutes, produce harmful collateral effects,
and entail, itself, a not inconsiderable intrusion into matters of religious faith." McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 520 (1961) (Frankfurter, J.,concurring).
153. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 445 (1961). The "legislative purpose is the
preservation of a traditional institution which assures to the community a time during which
the mind and body are released from the demands and distractions of an increasingly
mechanized and competition-driven society." Id. at 520 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
154. The Court opines that as Sunday is already "a day apart from all others," and that
the "cause [of that distinction] is irrelevant," and therefore its selection as the legally enforced
day of rest is realistic and reasonable. Id. at 452.
155. Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420
(1961), refuses to consider any day other than Sunday as being a reasonable alternative. Any
"such an attempt might prove as futile as the ephemeral decade of the French Republic of
1792." Id.at 483.
156. Laycock, Remnants, supranote 9, at 51, concedes that use of the Christian calendar
is a "sensible accommodation to the Christian majority," but by the same token that use
cannot be characterized as "religiously neutral." Thus those persons of other religions who
seek to observe their own holy days are "not seeking special treatment; he is seeking an
accommodation equal to that already extended to Christians." Id. The Jewish student should
be allowed to reschedule a test given to others on Yom Kippur because the system has
already seen to it that no similar tests will be required on Easter or Christmas.
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The limiting principle proposed here would reverse the priority given
the clauses (and thereby effectively overturn McGowan'57 and all its illconsidered progeny),"'8 furthering our goal of restricting the range of
circumstances within which Free Exercise protections must be granted, even
in an environment of a broad and expansive understanding of "religion."
Free Exercise accommodations should be withheld whenever their grant
would raise Establishment concerns.
2. Example: Lee v. Weisman
One case which straddles the line between Free Exercise and Establishment is that of Lee v. Weisman.'59 A young girl sued to prevent the
inclusion of prayers during her high school commencement ceremony. 6 °
The Supreme Court agreed that such rituals are inappropriate, at least as
structured in that case, that is, with the prayer being initiated, and the clergy
chosen by school officials who also offered guidelines on prayer content. 6 ' The primary injury is the "indirect" or psychological coercion
which will exert pressure upon nonbelieving students to comply with the

Justice Brennan, in his separate opinion to Allegheny County, 492 U.S. 573 (1989),
disputes the characterization of December as a holiday season for Judaism. In fact, the
preponderance of the Christian calendar has elevated a relatively minor Jewish holiday,
Chanukah, to one of singular importance in the United States, illustrating the religious
hegemony of the Christian majority actually reshaping minorities' religions to better conform
to its own expectations and needs. Id. at 645.
157. 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
158. Choper would preserve the mandatory Sunday closing laws. CHOPER, SECURING
RELIGIoUs LIBERTY, supra note 19, at 36. It seems a shame that someone who obviously
strives so hard to arrive at the right outcome should be so consistently wrong. Choper
describes his initial reaction to the challenges to the Sunday Closing laws as being a violation
of the Religion Clauses. His considered reflection, however, forced him to change his mind,
and instead to favor them. Id. at xii. He would also overturn (1) the Sherbert unemployment-compensation case, which held that a person could not be denied unemployment when
she loses her job for religious reasons. Id. at 126; (2) the draft exemptions for religious
objectors discussed by the Seegerand Welsh decisions. Id. at 129-31; and (3) those decisions
such as Edwards v. Aguillard,482 U.S. 578 (1987), which forbade the required teaching of
creation science. Id. at 146. In some cases he regrets these necessary outcomes, id. at 189190, but he does not view them as indicating a flaw within his reasoning, as perhaps he
should.
159. 112 S.Ct. 2649 (1992).

160. Id.

161. If some of these actions are genuinely performed by the students themselves, it
may change the outcome somewhat. See Stephen B. Pershing, Graduation Prayerafter Lee
v. Weisman: A CautionaryTale, 46 MERCER L. REv. 1097, 1120 (1995).
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prayer rituals so as to avoid unpleasant social consequences from their
'
peers. 62
The Lee majority, which did not include either Scalia or Rehnquist,
explicitly rejects the reasoning that accommodating Free Exercise should
supersede Establishment limitations.'6 3 They frame the problem thusly:
"What to most believers may seem nothing more than a reasonable request
is that the nonbeliever respect their religious practices, in a school context
may appear to the nonbeliever or dissenter to be an attempt to employ the
machinery of the State to enforce a religious orthodoxy."' 64
The limiting principle would not alter the outcome in this case. Rather,
it would tighten its reasoning. For instance, Scalia, in his dissent, objects
to the diffuse concept of "psychological coercion."' 6 5 While I believe that
the label refers to a genuine phenomenon, it is also clear that its introduction
opens the door to a host of other problems. 66 If commencement prayers
could be blocked without its use, the final opinion would be all the stronger.
The limiting principle provides such an alternative ground to justify and almost as importantly, to routinize - the outcome of Lee. The reliance
upon psychological coercion can have undesirable implications. For
instance, if prayers are forbidden because of the emotional burdens they
place on nonparticipants, then perhaps they would be acceptable if no such
nonparticipants were present. The limiting principle reinterprets the facts
so that the use of commencement prayers at public school ceremonies is
always wrong, even if one hundred percent of those attending desire them.
Relatedly, psychological coercion arises unpredictably and entirely
idiosyncratically depending upon who happens to be in the audience. The
limiting principle would allow one to reason a prioriwhat actions would
bring constitutional censure. Any increase in clarity should be deemed a
good thing.

162. Lee, 505 U.S. at 591-95.
163. Id. at 587.
164. Id. at 592 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part).
165. Id. at 636-37 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
166. For instance, at what point does emotional discomfort become coercion? How are
false claims based upon personal expedience to be differentiated from genuine claims arising
from mental distress? How can one ascertain that the negative emotional reaction is truly
generated by the contested actions, and that they are not merely being displaced upon them
from their original and wholly different source?
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E. NEW REGULATIONS ARE MORE VULNERABLE THAN OLDER ONES

1. Rationale
The fifth and last limiting principle is both the most difficult to
articulate and the weakest of the lot. Yet it touches on a distinction which
common sense suggests should make a difference when Free Exercise claims
are asserted.
The principle can be illustrated by a brief consideration of a recently
decided case, Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc., v. City of
Hialeah.'67 A Santeria congregation planned to open a facility within the
city limits of Hialeah, Florida. A central feature of this Afro-Cuban religion
is animal sacrifice. The city council reacted to this news by passing
ordinances which effectively outlawed animal sacrifice, exempting every
other kind of animal slaughter other than that practiced by Santeria. The
Supreme Court correctly ruled that these actions constituted an unusually
blatant governmental effort to impede the free exercise of religion without
a compensating secular interest.
In the actual case facts, the offending ordinances were passed after the
congregation made commitments to operate within the city. This temporal
sequence contributed to their vulnerability to constitutional challenge. But
what if the ordinances preceded the decision to relocate? It would certainly
have been that much more difficult to demonstrate that they were primarily
designed to restrict Santeria worship, since there was none. This difference
seems as though it should make a difference, although not necessarily a
determinative one. In the first case, the laws are reactive to religious
activities; in the second case, the same laws precede the religious activities,
and hence should be somewhat less offensive constitutionally.
In at least one other context, laws governing recognized marriages, a
similar principle to that proposed here is already operative. "[T]here is an
obvious difference between a couple that recently married outside the state
in order to evade its marriage restrictions and a couple that moved into the
state after living together for twenty years in a place that recognized their
union."' 8 Although both couples have legal marriages in the eyes of State
B, the question is, should these marriages be recognized by State A in
disregard to its own laws?

167. 508 U.S. 520, 525-26 (1993).
168. LARRY KRAMER, How OTHER STATES CAN IGNORE HAWAII, IN SAME-SEX
MARRIAGE: PRO AND CON: A READER 329, 332 (Andrew Sullivan ed. 1997).
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The first couple displayed a bad faith attempt to circumvent the laws
of State A, their legal residence. The second couple contracted a legal
marriage in State B, which they intended to be their permanent legal
residence, but after twenty years, the accidents of life find them now
residing in State A, where the marriage is illegal. The intents of the two
couples differ, and this should make a difference in the decision by State A
about what to do with these illegitimate (by its standards) maniages. In most
cases, it does make a difference; marriages of the first type are much less
likely to be recognized by State A than those of the second type.
Perhaps this bad faith/good faith distinction better captures the criterion
for this fifth limiting principle. Entrenched (good faith) religious practices
should be at least somewhat protected from arbitrary or unavoidable changes
in the legal environment. On the other hand, religious persons and entities
should not have unrestrained freedom to move into any setting they choose,
and then demand that it alter its established practices to accommodate the
newcomers.' 69 Some of these moves may be bad-faith motivated - for
example, they may be designed to be deliberately provocative to the
established social order - and if so, they should be turned aside.
2. Example: Zoning Cases
The proposed limiting principle would be particularly useful in making
sense out of the plethora of zoning cases. In the sample surveyed for this
essay, none of them presented the circumstances which would have strongly
favored a Free Exercise claim: An ensconced church with a history of
relevant activities, is suddenly faced with changes in the zoning ordinances
which would forbid these historical practices. Instead, they all involve
churches who wished to introduce new activities into areas with established
zoning ordinances which conflicted with their intended uses. Should a
church have unrestricted license, for example, to move into a residential area
and open a homeless shelter or a drug rehabilitation clinic?

169. The Supreme Court has, however, ruled that religious entities are to be afforded
great leeway in this regard. In Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Florida, 480
U.S. 136 (1987), the Court faced a Sherbert-like case where sabbatarian practices conflicted
with required work schedules. Hobbie's case was not weakened, it concluded, because she
had converted to her Seventh-Day Adventist beliefs after the work schedule had already been
established. While in this case the outcome may be satisfactory, the proposed limiting
principle maintains that this variable of change should always be considered, even it is always
rejected as irrelevant. Perhaps Hobbie had other grounds for disliking the schedule, and
ostensibly converted her religion as a pretext for refusing to work it. Some effort should be
made to eliminate this possibility.
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The responses have been diverse. On the one hand, many cases play
out as they should, by the standard of this limiting principle. 7 Germantown Seventh Day Adventist v. City of Philadelphia,7 ' FirstAssembly of
God of Naples, Florida, Inc. v. Collier County,'72 and Daytona Rescue
Mission, Inc. v. City of Daytona Beach'73 fit perfectly the facts and results
recommended by the limiting principle. Ordinance enactment preceded
contested church activity, and no Free Exercise burden was found."'
However, an equal number of cases can be cited which arrive at the
opposite result despite largely identical fact situations.'7 5 There is clearly
no well-defined standard by which such cases are to be decided. The
adoption of the proposed limiting principle would bring uniformity to this
issue.
CONCLUSION

Smith effectively removed all protections traditionally accorded the free
exercise of religion. RFRA was designed to undue the effects of this
decision by presumably setting back the clock of jurisprudence back to the
day before Smith. Even if RFRA is found to be constitutional, it will still,
of itself, be ultimately ineffective, since it undoes the effects of Smith
without addressing the confluence of issues which made a decision like
Smith likely. The clock may be set back, but without significant changes
it can be expected to run forward again in much the same manner as it did
the first time. A reprise of Smith looms in the future.
The probable worries which necessitated Smith was the combination of
a broad definition of religion with a generous policy of religious accommo-

170. This would not necessarily mean that the complaints should fail against the
ordinances entirely, but only that the Free Exercise prong of the complaint should fail. Many
of the cases also introduce Due Process, Free Speech, and other grounds to contest the
burdening zoning ordinances, and it is possible that the religious organization could still
succeed on these alternative grounds.
171. No. Civ. A. 94-1633, 1994 WL 470191 at *1 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
172. 20 F. 3d 419 (11th Cir. 1994).
173. 885 F. Supp. 1554 (M.D. Fla. 1995).
174. The cases do not explicitly state that because the facts followed the specified
chronological order (ordinance first, then church action), thereforethe Free Exercise claim
was weakened. This reasoning sequence, however, is the crix of the proposed limiting
principle.
175. Cornerstone Bible Church v. City of Hastings, 948 F.2d 464 (8th Cir. 1991);
Western Presbyterian Church v. Board of Zoning Adjustment, 862 F. Supp. 538 (D.C. 1994);
Jesus Center v. Farmington Hills Zoning Board of Appeals, 544 N.W.2d 698 (Mich. Ct. App.
1996).
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dation. While each factor is easily defensible alone, in our hugely pluralistic
society their joint operation could stultify every government action.
Of the three possible ways to avoid this outcome, Smith represents the
one which is easiest for the judiciary. It washes its hands of the matter
entirely, essentially deletes the Free Exercise Clause, and throws the matter
of accommodation over to the legislature. An alternative solution, however,
is one which systematically limits the reach of Free Exercise exemptions
without compromising either our evolved understanding of "religion" or our
traditional interpretation of the constitution. Such an approach encourages
the crafting of limiting principles which would restrict the present ubiquity
of Free Exercise claims. While these principles would deny Free Exercise
protections to some, they would do so in a rational and even-handed way,
and only to the extent necessary to trim back the universe of potential
claims so that the core intent - discarded under Smith - can be preserved.
All of the five proposed principles have roots in standing legal theory.
The primary job herein has been to isolate them and elevate them into
explicit guidelines. In some instances their use would significantly alter
current legal opinions; in others, the outcomes would be the same but the
path to those ends would become better reasoned.
The five proposed principles to limit Free Exercise protections are: (1)
Individuals are better protected than groups; (2) Central beliefs and activities
are better protected than peripheral, derivative, or subsidiary beliefs and
activities; (3) Beliefs and actions which place demands on the believer himor herself are better protected than those which place the demands on other
persons; (4) Free Exercise accommodations are to be withheld if their grant
would raise Establishment concerns; and (5) When religious activities clash
with external conditions, the temporally prior state takes precedence.
The Free Exercise Clause would thereby offer its strongest protections
to personal, central beliefs and actions about personal conduct whose
accommodation does not raise Establishment issues, and which are
threatened by new governmental dictates. Least protected would be group
peripheral beliefs and actions which impose demands upon unwilling others,
whose accommodation raises Establishment issues, where the conflict arises
because of knowingly moving from a context which did not present this
tension into one that did.
These principles would function to limit Free Exercise claims by acting
as a bar at the threshold. If the facts implicate any of them, the courts are
free to dispense with any further adjudication. Even when hearings are
necessary to ascertain certain issues (e.g., is the belief central, is the
Establishment Clause implicated), they outline which questions should be
asked, and remove doubt as to the correct outcome should the facts be found
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to fit into the described principles. The net outcome will be to restrict
significantly, as compared to the pre-Smith/present RFRA environment, both
the total number of potential Free Exercise claims and the amount of court
time that is needed to deliberate on many others. The principled scaling
back should soothe somewhat the Smith fears of Free Exercise-instigated
civil anarchy, and thereby permit the full First Amendment protections to
be offered to those cases which fall outside the shadow of the limiting
principles.

